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I. INTRODUCTION
The REAL ID Act will also weed out fraudulent asylum applications made by
people lying through their teeth. By ferreting out asylum fraud, the supplemental
appropriations bill strengthens our asylum system so those legitimately fleeing
persecution are welcomed here[.] 1
Recent efforts to reform U.S. immigration law, especially House Bill
4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration
Control Act,2 sparked mass peaceful protests in April 2006 with hundreds
of thousands of individuals marching in cities across the United States to
oppose stiffer criminal penalties for undocumented immigrants and
demand legislation to legalize their immigration status.3 Proponents of
increased immigration restrictions claim that there are 12 million
undocumented immigrants in the United States and that any effort to
legalize their status will reward those who break U.S. laws and weaken
1. Press Release, Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., House Passes Real
ID (May 5, 2005), at http://www.house.gov/sensenbrenner/pr2005O5O5.html (on file with
SDILJ) [hereinafter "House Passes Real ID"] (Congressman Sensenbrenner is Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee).
2. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005) (referred to Senate Committee on Jan. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter "Border Protection bill"]. The Senate did not approve the Border Protection
bill, but instead passed its own version of immigration reform in the Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter "Comprehensive
Immigration Reform bill"].
3. Thousands of Latin American, Asian, and African immigrants, high school
students, religious leaders, along with many other groups have marched in cities across
the U.S. including, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Dallas, and Washington, D.C., to protest House
Bill 4437, the Border Protection bill. Protests in Los Angeles and Dallas drew at least
500,000 people. Protestors condemn House Bill 4437 section 203 which makes unlawful
presence in the U.S. a federal felony and section 202 which expands the definition of
alien smuggling and has been interpreted as making it a crime to provide basic
humanitarian assistance to an undocumented immigrant. See, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock,
Felony Threat Rouses Immigrants: Stiff Penalty in a House Bill Spurred Hundreds of
Thousands to March in Cities Around the Nation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12,
2006, at 2; Immigration Rallies Flood Cities Small and Large, USA TODAY, Apr. 11,
2006, at 3A; Leslie Berestein, 50,000 Throng Downtown in Immigrant-Rights March:
Protesters Seek to Sway Congress, Overhaul Policy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 10,
2006, at Al; Cynthia Leonor Garza, Wave of Immigration Rallies Begins Today:
Thousands Are Expected to March in Events Planned through Monday, Hous. CHRON.,
Apr. 9, 2006, at B 1; Protests Go On in Several Cities as Panel Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2006, at A12.
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national security.4 Congress faces acrimonious debate over immigration
reform as the House and Senate have passed competing legislation,
which will be difficult to reconcile.5 Approximately one year before
these mass protests over immigration reform, Congress enacted under
the guise of "national security," the REAL ID Act of 2005 ("REAL
ID"), which restricts asylum eligibility and curtails judicial review of
deportation orders.6
In the post 9/11 era, REAL ID represents an outgrowth of national
security legislation prompted by the U.S. global war on terror.7 The
House Conference Report on REAL ID urged asylum reform in response
to the 9/11 Commission's findings 8 that terrorist aliens9 exploited U.S.
asylum and immigration laws. 10 Fear of terrorist aliens is not the only
4. See e.g., Michelle Malkin, The Illegal Alien "Gold Card", PITrSBURG TRIB.
REV., Mar.15, 2006; P.J. Corr, Illegal Immigrants Represent: 'Thrashing' of U.S.
Citizenship, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 17, 2006, at 2.
5. On May 25, 2006, the Senate passed the Comprehensive Immigration Reform
bill, which includes a provision that would offer a path to legalization to undocumented
immigrants who have worked and resided in the U.S. for five years. Frank James,
Senate Oks Immigration Reform Bill: Passage Sets up Showdown with Tough House
Plan, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2006, at 1. See Rick Klein, House GOP Draws Line on
Immigration, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 2006, at Al (discussing the significant divisions
between House and Senate lawmakers regarding immigration reform).
6. Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231-302 (2005) [hereinafter "REAL
ID"]. REAL ID was enacted May 11, 2005 as part of an emergency appropriations bill,
but was originally introduced as H.R. 418.
7. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-77, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) [hereinafter "Patriot Act Reauthorization"]. Patriot
Act Reauthorization encountered considerable opposition in Congress concerning the
effectiveness of the Patriot Act's homeland security provisions and whether incursions
on civil liberties were justified. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Legislation to
Renew Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A14. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54
STAN. L. REV. 953, 955-57 (2002) (discussing the erosion of civil liberties, especially the
freedoms of noncitizens, in the name of national security).
8. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 13-14 (2004)
[hereinafter "9/11 COMMISSION REPORT"]; 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 72, 80-82 (2004),
available at http://www.9-I lcommission.gov/report/91IReport.pdf; 9/11 AND TERRORIST
TRAVEL, STAFF REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES 138-39 (2004), available at http://www.9-Ilcommission.gov/
staffstatements /911 _TerrTrav Ch5.pdf.
9. While recognizing that the term "alien" is offensive, it is the term used in
asylum and immigration law literature and will be used throughout this Comment. See
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2005)
("'[A]lien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.").
10. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 109-72, 160 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240,
286 (indicating that Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, among others, has abused lax U.S. asylum laws).
factor stimulating greater restrictions on asylum eligibility. Current
asylum reform efforts are partly driven by a preoccupation with activist
judges, especially as evidenced by the attempt to divide the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ("Ninth Circuit")" and consolidate the filing of
immigration appeals in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. '
2
REAL ID was a response to calls for stricter enforcement of laws
relating to refugees and immigrants. Those calls stressed greater policing of
entry into the United States and ensuring that aliens who violate the law
are deported.' 3  Media accounts of the legislation focused on fast-
tracking construction of a reinforced section of border fence in the San
Diego region and establishing a new requirement that states issue
federally approved driver's licenses. 14  However, three provisions of
REAL ID have profound implications for asylum law: (1) the heightened
credibility standards, (2) stripped judicial review of detention, and (3)
expanded bars to asylum for any involvement in terrorist-related
activities. "
11. House Judiciary Chairman Sensenbrenner stated that one of his aims was to
return asylum law to the way it was prior to activist judges' interpretation of it.
According to Sensenbrenner, "[1]iberal activist judges in the 9th Circuit have been
overturning clearly established precedent and are preventing immigration judges from
denying bogus asylum applications by aliens who are clearly lying[.]" Howard Mintz,
US. Tightens Asylum Rules: More Evidence Needed from Immigrants, S.J. MERCURY-
NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005, at A13. See Bob Egelko, New Limit on Review of Asylum Cases
Immigration Judges' Decisions Would Be Harder to Overturn, S.F. CHRON., May 16,
2005, at Al. Sensenbrenner also introduced a bill to divide the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which the Justice Department supported. See Erica Werner, Court Breakup
Receives Support, S.J. MERCuRY-NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005, at B5.
12. The Senate is examining legislation to consolidate immigration appeals in the
Federal Circuit. Securing America's Borders Act, S. 2454 § 501, 109th Cong. (2006)
(bill calendared in May 2006) [hereinafter "Securing America's Borders Act"]. Letter
from Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, to Senators Specter and Leahy 2 (Mar. 31, 2006) (on file with SDILJ)
(discussing the increase in appeals of Board of Immigration Appeals' decisions from 900
in 2001 to 6500 in 2005 and opposing the provision in the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2006 that would consolidate immigration appeals in the Federal Circuit).
Emma Schwartz, A Simmering Border Dispute: A Plan to Have the Federal Circuit Hear
Immigration Appeals Worries Judges and Advocates Alike, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006,
at 1 (noting that the Federal Circuit is ill equipped to handle the nation's immigration
appeals as consolidation "would foist a growing docket of more than 12,000 cases a year
on to a court whose 12 judges usually handle no more than 125 cases annually").
13. See, e.g., Kathy Kiely, Republicans Debate How Tight Border Should Be, USA
TODAY, Apr. 29, 2005, at 17A.
14. See, e.g., Elisa Crouch, "Real ID" Has States Scrambling, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, May 12, 2005, at Al; Donna Leinwand, Real ID Act Edges Closer to
Passage, USA TODAY, May 6, 2005, at 3A; Mary Curtius, Tough Stand Likely on IDs,
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2005, at 1.
15. See REAL ID Now the Law, 82 No. 20 INTERPRETER RELEASES 813 (May 16,
2005) [hereinafter "REAL ID Now the Law"]; Michael Garcia, Margaret Mikyung Lee
& Todd Tatelman, IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE REAL ID
ACT OF 2005, CRS REPORT RL32754 (updated May 25, 2005), available at http://fpc.
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U.S. asylum policy is an extremely volatile issue. Its very terms are
highly charged, as evidenced by the strong opposition to labeling U.S.
citizens "refugees" because the term connotes foreignness. Following
Hurricane Katrina, there was considerable backlash from calling evacuees
of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast "refugees". 16 Current efforts at
immigration reform,' especially as evidenced by vitriolic rhetoric in
public debates' 8 and mass demonstrations opposing proposed stiffer criminal
penalties for undocumented immigrants, 19 illustrate the divisiveness of
immigration and asylum policies. In asylum and refugee literature and
this Comment, the term "refugee" refers to an individual outside her
country of nationality who fears returning to that country, whereas,
''asylum seeker" refers to an alien physically present in the United States
who fears returning to the country from which she fled.
state.gov/documents/organization/47141.pdf [hereinafter "IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE
MAJOR PROVISIONS OF REAL ID"].
16. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, newspaper editors around the U.S.
received a flurry of letters expressing indignation over the use of the term "refugee." In
early September 2005, President Bush bowed to some of the criticism and stated that
evacuees from Hurricane Katrina are "not refugees[;] [t]hey are Americans[.]" Harry
Levins, Are Victims Refugees? Editors, Dictionaries, Readers Weigh in, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Sep. 7, 2005, at A13. Reverend Jesse Jackson, reflecting a growing public
sentiment, expressed his outrage that evacuees from New Orleans were labeled
"refugees." Laura Maggi, "Refugee " a Demeaning Term, Jackson Says, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14616419.
17. The Border Protection bill creates a statutory bar to asylum for any alien
participating in a "criminal street gang" which violates human rights standards regarding
arbitrary detention. H.R. REP. No. 109-345 (Part 1) (2005) (Section 608 of the Border
Protection bill renders alien gang members deportable and inadmissible, mandates their
detention, and bars them from receiving asylum or Temporary Protected Status).
18. Compare Anne C. Mulkern, Tancredo Labels Bill as Threat to Security, DENV.
POST, Feb. 26, 2006, at A 18 (According to Congressman Tancredo, "[b]y legalizing the
millions upon millions of illegal aliens in the U.S., [Senator] Specter makes a mockery
of our laws and crushes our already strained legal immigration system") with Teresa
Watanabe, Immigrants Gain the Pulpit, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2006, at 1 ("'The war on
terror isn't going to be won through immigration restrictions,' [Cardinal Roger Mahony]
said... [and] he would instruct his priests to defy legislation-if approved by Congress
-that would require churches and other social organizations to ask immigrants for legal
documentation before providing assistance and penalize them if they refuse to do so.").
19. See supra note 3 and accompanying text But see Dahleen Glanton, Illegal
Immigrants Brace for State Laws: Legislatures Push Own Measures as Congress
Struggles to Reach Consensus, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 10, 2006, at 1 (discussing efforts by state
legislators in Georgia, Virginia, and Tennessee to restrict illegal immigration and
improve enforcement of immigration laws even though immigration is an area
traditionally left to Congress).
Under domestic and international law, the United States has obligations
not to peremptorily return individuals fearing for their life or freedom. 0
Article 33 of the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees
("Refugee Convention") sets forth this duty, known as non-refoulement
or protection from return.2' Article 1 of the Refugee Convention defines a
"refugee" as a person outside her country of nationality who has a "well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion"
22such that she is unable or unwilling to return to that country. Although
the United States did not initially sign the Refugee Convention,23 it
became a party to the Convention in 1968 by acceding to the 1967 UN
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Protocol"). 24 The
duty of non-refoulement, beyond treaty obligations contained in Article
33 of the Refugee Convention, has achieved the status of customary
international law, thus, binding states that are non-parties to the Refugee
Convention. 25 U.S. legislation, through the "withholding of removal
' 26
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, also recognizes the
20. Article 33 of Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 (achieved
sufficient signatories Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter "Refugee Convention"]. Article 33 of
the Refugee Convention sets forth that the host country has discretion to exclude
refugees who are threats to security or have been convicted of a particularly serious
crime. Article 1 provides that states may exclude individuals who have committed
crimes against peace, humanity, or war crimes, as well as those who committed a serious
non-political crime outside the country of refuge. Id. at 6263. See also Article 3 of
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 14 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1028 (entered into force
June 26, 1987) [hereinafter "Convention Against Torture"].
21. Refugee Convention, supra note 20, at 19 U.S.T. 6276 ("No Contracting State
shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.").
22. Id at 6261.
23. See Harold Hongju Koh, America's Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RICH. L.
REv. 139, 145 n.28 (1994).
24. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, T.I.A.S. 6577 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter
"Refugee Protocol"].
25. GuY S. GOODWIN GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (2d ed.
1996); Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
229, 252 (1996); Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the
Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, 89, 140-46 in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
(Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ?
id=41a1b5 1c6 (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem rely upon the International Court of Justice's
analysis in North Sea Shelf case to assert that non-refoulement has achieved status of
customary international law).
26. Previously known as Withholding of Deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)
(1988).
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duty of non-refoulement.27 In addition, as a signatory to the Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ("Convention Against Torture") the United States has a duty
not to return an individual to a country where there are substantial
grounds for believing that she would be subjected to torture.28
Nevertheless, numerous commentators have observed that the United
States has enacted procedures violating its duty of non-refoulement.
29
One critic highlights the discrepancy between United States and
international law in the adjudication of asylum claims and argues that
"[t]he gap between available domestic protection and the imperatives of
international obligation results in a serious denial of justice to many
asylum-seekers.
30
Contracting states reaffirmed their commitment to the Convention and
Protocol in 2001, which marked the 50th anniversary of the Refugee
Convention. 31 However, 2001 did not signal an expansion of refugee
27. In addition to asylum, which is governed by INA section 208 (2005) [(8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (2005)], the INA contains several related relief provisions, including "withholding of
removal" under INA § 241(b)(3)(B) (2005) [8 U.S.C. § 123 l(b)(3)(A) (2005)], as well as
withholding and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture pursuant to 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.17 (2005). Although the United States became a party to the
Refugee Protocol in 1968, it was not until the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980
(Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102) that U.S. law conformed with international treaty
obligations under the Refugee Protocol. See Kathleen M. Keller, Note, A Comparative
and International Law Perspective on the United States (Non)Compliance with its Duty
ofNon-Refoulement, 2 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 183, 194 (1999).
28. See Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, supra note 20. The U.S.
implemented the Convention Against Torture's prohibition against return of an
individual who is more likely than not to be tortured in the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277 at § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998).
Regulations adopted pursuant to this legislation are codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18,
1208.16-18, and 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2005).
29. Koh, supra note 23, at 145-46; Keller, supra note 27, at 184; Samuel L. David,
Note, A Foul Immigration Policy: U.S. Misinterpretation of the Non-Refoulement
Obligation under the Convention Against Torture, 19 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 769, 804
(2003).
30. Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of US. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1997).
31. Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Ministerial Meeting of States Parties, Geneva,
Switzerland, Dec. 12-13, 2001, U.N. Doc. HCR!MMSP/2001/09 (2002), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdftbl=PUBL&id=419c74d64
(hereinafter "2001 Declaration"]. The 2001 Declaration was welcomed by the U.N.
General Assembly in resolution A/RES/57/187, para. 4, adopted on Dec. 18, 2001.
Paragraph 4 is "at its core the principle of non-refoulement, whose applicability is
embedded in customary international law[.]" Id.
protection. On the contrary, even though 146 states are parties to the
Refugee Convention or Protocol,32 Western countries have increasingly
restricted the entry of refugees within their territories and are more
inclined to detain refugees who reach their borders without a valid entry
document.
33
National security has become an ubiquitous term in recent years.
34
The term is invoked to justify restricting asylum law, associated with the
scapegoating of refugees and immigrants,35 and is often cast in opposition to
civil liberties.36 National security has become a term of art, which is
frequently referenced to justify efforts to police entry into the United
States by tightening immigration and asylum laws even though the
effectiveness of these measures is unsubstantiated.37 Popular usage of
the term offers a skewed perspective that national security has only
recently become a dominant concern. On the contrary, national security
as applied to control of territorial borders has a long heritage and is
32. States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
the 1967 Protocol, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-in/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=
3b73b0d63.
33. See generally Liza Schuster, A Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Deportation,
Detention and Dispersal in Europe, 37 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 233 (2003); Andrew I.
Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 323-33 (2005); THE REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, U.S. REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 1 (May 2003) ("The U.S. refugee program
is at the most critical stage in its history, with only 27,508 refugees, the lowest in 25
years, having been resettled in the United States in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002.").
34. National security and immigration were central topics during the 45th Mexico-
U.S. Interparliamentary group meeting in March 2006. U.S. and Mexican legislators
recognized a shared responsibility on migration and border security, but Mexican
legislators continue to protest the proposed construction of another wall along the U.S.-
Mexico border. See Jason Lange, U.S., Mexico Discuss Migration, Security, Mar. 6,
2006, available at http://www.banderasnews.com/0603/nr-valledebravo.htm. See also
Concluyen trabajos de la Interparlamentaria M~xico-Estados Unidos, BOLETIN 2714 Bis
(Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://comunicacion.diputados.gob.mx/boletines/2006/boltn_
030306.htm. Furthermore, the topic of immigration was also central at the recent
trilateral summit between U.S., Mexico, and Canada, even though there was no consensus as
to how to approach the issue. See William Douglas, Summit Ends with No Gains:
Immigration Divides Bush, Fox, Harper, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETrE, Apr. 1, 2006, at Al.
35. See generally MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 1-14 (2004) (discussing the ways that national security
concerns resulted in the scapegoating of aliens focusing on the 1920s-1940s); Audrey
Macklin, Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-US Safe Third Country
Agreement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 365, 369 (2005) ("The cumulative impact of
various measures designed to deter asylum seekers is to drive them deeper into the hands
of smugglers and the world of clandestine, illegal and dangerous modes of travel...
[leading to the view of them as] 'illegals.'").
36. See Ronald Dworkin, Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, THE NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 6, 2003, at 37.
37. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real
ID Act is a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 103 (2006).
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rooted in the concept of sovereignty. The discourse and increased
prominence of national security in legislation since 9/11, however, has
contributed to a political climate where legislation restricting immigrants'
and asylum seekers' rights generates relatively little protest and scant
public notice.3 3
Focusing on defensive39 asylum applications, this Comment examines
whether certain provisions of REAL ID violate due process and
international obligations to asylum seekers. Part I situates REAL ID
within the historical context of nearly a decade of restrictive U.S.
immigration law and over two decades of Executive Orders aimed at
deterring a mass exodus of asylum seekers from reaching U.S. shores.
Part II provides an overview of the U.S. asylum system and argues that
the system produces inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary results,
indicating that segments of the system do not satisfy international
obligations. Part III outlines three provisions of REAL ID: 1) heightened
burden of proof, credibility, and corroborating evidence standards; 2)
stripped judicial review of detention; and 3) terrorist-related bars to
asylum; and examines their implications with respect to asylum case
law. Part IV explains how those three provisions of REAL ID violate due
process and international law. Part V recommends restoring administrative
appellate review of immigration judges' decisions, restoring judicial
review of discretionary determinations in the asylum process, making
individual determinations of whether an asylum seeker should be
detained during proceedings, providing asylum seekers with an attorney,
raising the quality of legal representation in Immigration Courts, and
providing adjudicators and asylum officers with greater guidance on
credibility and evidence standards.
38. Demonstrations across the U.S. in March and April 2006 protesting proposed
immigration restrictions and demanding an amnesty for undocumented immigrants
suggest that certain sectors are no longer willing to remain silent on the increased
restriction of immigrants' rights. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Thousands Rally in
New York in Support of Immigrants'Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, at 129.
39. There are two paths to asylum: filing an affirmative application with the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") or a defensive application where the
asylum seeker has been placed in removal proceedings and the application is filed to
request relief from deportation. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES 5 (3d ed. 1999).
II. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW: RESTRICTIVE CLIMATE
The central body of U.S. immigration and asylum law, the Immigration
and Nationality Act ("INA")40 has undergone substantial changes in the
last twenty-five years. In 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS"), the executive agency charged with administering and
enforcing immigration and asylum laws was dismantled and its functions
were transferred to various components within the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS").
4 1
Fear of illegal immigration and calls to build more fencing along the
U.S.-Mexico border,4 2 Coast Guard vessels interdicting Cuban and
Haitian refugees on makeshift rafts at sea,4 3 and greater concern with
preventing foreign terrorists from entering the country, characterize this
twenty-five year period.4 4  Immigration officials expressed growing
concerns that asylum seekers were presenting false claims to secure
employment authorization. 45 Seizing and fueling public sentiment with
curbing immigration, Speaker Gingrich's Congressional Task Force
proposed several reforms,46 including those which became the Illegal
Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA")
47
40. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") was created in 1952 by the
McCarran-Walter Act to centralize and codify immigration statutes. Pub. L. No. 82-414,
66 Stat. 163 (1952).
41. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
For clarity, this Comment will refer whenever possible to the various DHS components,
rather than the INS, which have been responsible since 2003 for administering and
enforcing asylum law.
42. See generally JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE
'ILLEGAL ALIEN' AND THE MAKING OF THE US-MEXICO BOUNDARY 165-66 (2001); Jorge
A. Vargas, US. Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International
Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 1, 37-61 (2001).
43. See generally MARIO ANTONIO RIVERA, DECISION AND STRUCTURE: U.S.
REFUGEE POLICY IN THE MARIEL CRISIS 41-54 (1991); Abby Goodnough, Tensions Rise
as More Flee Cuba for U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005.
44. See Cole, supra note 7, at 957. See also Jennifer Lin, Is America Closing Its
Doors? More and More Americans Fear That Immigration Threatens the National
Culture and Their Personal Economic Well-Being, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Jul. 2,
1995, at IE ("'The word is out all over the world that you can just come here illegally
and you don't have to worry,' [Congressman] Bilbray said. 'That's the kind of message
we've got to stop. We need to bring credibility back to immigration law."').
45. See Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Meissner Confirmation Hearing, 70
No. 38 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1289 (Oct. 4, 1993).
46. See Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: an Inside
Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 349, 355 (2005).
47. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). President Clinton, when signing the Illegal Immigration
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") into law, declared that this
"landmark" legislation "strengthens the rule of law by cracking down on illegal
immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system-without
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and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA").
48
A. Restrictive Legislation Since 1996: JIRIRA, AEDPA,
and Patriot Act
An aim of lIRIRA was to increase the distinction between illegal and
legal immigration. The legislation was supposed to reduce illegal
immigration by improving immigration officers' ability to deport an alien
who lacked valid entry documents or made a material misrepresentation
through a procedure known as expedited removal. 49 Expedited removal
grants immigration officers the power to exclude without a hearing an
alien at a port-of-entry into the United States who lacks valid entry
documents and certain criminal aliens.5 ° IIRIRA and AEDPA sought to
expand expedited removal by restricting judicial review of immigration
decisions thereby speeding the process of deporting an unlawful alien.51 In
addition, IIRIRA enlarged the grounds of inadmissibility52 and deportability,
as well as broadened the category of crimes constituting an aggravated
felony, which bars relief from deportation.53
While proponents of the expanded application of expedited removal
claimed that administrative efficiency and national security justified its
expansion, critics noted that expedited removal has been devastating for
punishing those living in the United States legally." Statement by President William J.
Clinton upon Signing H.R. 3610, Sept. 30, 1996, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3388,
3391.
48. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (restricting judicial review of
deportation decisions and narrowing the class of aliens eligible for a discretionary waiver
of deportation). See generally Rachel K. Hinkle, INS v. St. Cyr, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
815 (2002) (discussing AEDPA in the context of immigration law).
49. 1-2 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.04
(2005). For a detailed account of the debates surrounding 1996 asylum reform
legislation, see PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL
BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM (2000).
50. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 49.
51. Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1997); James M.
Czapla, Removal of Judicial Review Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act: The Different Interpretations of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(B)(3)(B),
38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 603, 609-10 (2005).
52. The term inadmissibility refers to precluding certain aliens from entering the
U.S. Grounds of inadmissibility include public health threat, convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, prostitution, national security-terrorists, and likely to
become a public charge. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2005).
53. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 49.
asylum seekers who often are not familiar with the asylum process.54
IIRIRA and AEDPA compounded the difficulties asylum seekers, who
usually lack legal representation, faced in navigating through the maze of
asylum law by adding jurisdictional barriers from the moment of the
initial request for asylum at the port-of-entry.5 5 Asylum seekers at the
port-of-entry were particularly vulnerable having often survived traumatic
experiences, often lacking English language skills to communicate, and
were unlikely to carry documentary proof of their asylum claim.
56
Further, although the prolonged detention of asylum seekers was not a
stated goal of AEDPA or IRIRA, it was one of the consequences of
these measures.5 7
Humanitarian assistance58 to asylum seekers and refugees was receding,
but in 2001 Congress significantly altered the guiding principles concerning
immigrants and asylum seekers. After the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the World Trade Center, Congress enacted the Patriot Act, expanding
law enforcement powers in an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks.
The Patriot Act marks a shift in U.S. asylum law. 59 One of its most
controversial provisions, recently revisited by Congress,60 is the indefinite
detention of non-citizens suspected of posing a threat to national
security. 61 Although the Patriot Act did not substantially modify asylum
54. See Craig Haney, Conditions of Confinement for Detained Asylum Seekers
Subject to Expedited Removal, in 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL 178, 191-99 (U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, Feb. 2005), available
at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylnum -refugees/2005/february/conditionConfm.
pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2006). Expedited removal is governed by regulations 8 C.F.R.
§§ 235.3(b)(2)(iii) and 235.3(b)(4) (2005).
55. See Keller, supra note 27, at 203-04; James F. Smith, United States
Immigration Law as We Know It: El Clandestino, the American Gulag, Rounding up the
Usual Suspects, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 747, 781 (2005) (discussing expedited removal
with regard to criminal aliens).
56. See U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS
IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, Executive Summary, 1, 3-4 (Feb. 2005), available at http://
www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylumrefugees/2005/february/execsun.pdf (last visited
Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter "REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL"].
57. Lofgren, supra note 46, at 356, 364-65.
58. The Department of Health and Human Services provides humanitarian
assistance, including cash, medical assistance, skills training, and job placement, for
refugees living in the United States. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Administration for Children and Families, Office of Refugee Resettlement, General
Information, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/geninfo/index.htm (last visited
Aug. 27, 2006).
59. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (signed into law on October 26, 2001) [hereinafter "Patriot Act"].
60. Patriot Act Reauthorization, supra note 7.
61. See Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: the Unintended Consequences of
the USA Patriot Act for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 507-08 (2002)
(discussing the implications of the Patriot Act for asylum seekers). Regarding the Patriot
Act, "[u]nlike in 1995 and 1996, when the INS by regulation and later Congress by
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or withholding of removal in the INA's text, the Patriot Act disqualifies
asylum seekers who are deemed to have engaged in terrorist activity.62
Also included in the Patriot Act was a provision authorizing immigration
hearings to be closed to the public. 63 One commentator notes that closed
hearings is part of a policy of "[s]ecrecy across the board, without any
obligation to present case-specific reasons for it in court, has less to do
with the war on terrorism than with the administration's consistent
efforts, firmly in place before 9-11, to insulate executive action from
public scrutiny. '64 The implications are very alarming for asylum seekers
who are often anxious and bewildered by the asylum process when they
first come into contact with an immigration officer, have significant
communication barriers, and lack access to an attorney.65
The Bush Administration has pursued such a broad interpretation of
who has provided material support to a terrorist organization that victims
who were forced to provide assistance are ineligible for asylum.66 In
April 2001, the U.S. Committee for Refugees criticized the INS Asylum
statute sought to overhaul the asylum process because of both real and perceived abuses,
neither Congress nor the Administration highlighted (or even mentioned) the need to
reform the asylum process." Id. at 517.
62. The Patriot Act amended the INA § 208(b)(2)(iv) and (v), thus barring from
asylum individuals who are a threat to national security or who have engaged in, are
likely to engage in, or have incited terrorist activity, are representatives of foreign
terrorist organizations, or who use their positions of prominence to endorse terrorist
activity. See id at 518.
63. Former Chief Immigration Judge Creppy issued regulations and there has been
some backtracking on this issue of closed immigration hearings. It appears that sensitive
material is granted a protective order, it cannot be disclosed, and that portion of the
hearing is closed. See id. at 525 n.139. Federal appellate courts are split regarding
whether closure of immigration hearings to the public withstands constitutional attack.
Compare North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that newspapers do not have a constitutional right of access to deportation
hearings), with Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding directive closing deportation hearings impermissibly infringed on newspapers'
constitutional right of access).
64. Stephen J. Schulhofer, At War With Liberty: Post 9-11 Due Process and
Security Have Taken a Beating, AM. PROSPECT 5, 9 (Mar. 1, 2003).
65. See Germain, supra note 61, at 515-16.
66. Michele L. Lomardo et al., Terrorism, Material Support, the Inherent Right to
Self-Defense, and the U.S. Obligation to Protect Legitimate Asylum Seekers in a Post-
9/11, Post-Patriot Act, Post-REAL ID Act World, 4 REGENT J. INT'L L. 237, 238 (2006).
See Rachel L. Swains, Provision of Antiterror Law Delays Entry of Refugees, N.Y.
TtMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A20 (Resettlement of Burmese refugees from Thailand to the
U.S. was in question because refugees paid taxes or provided food to rebel groups
resisting the repressive and authoritarian Burmese government; such activities are considered
providing material support to a terrorist organization.).
Office for labeling "extortion," the payment of ransom to Colombian
guerrillas, as "material support to a terrorist organization".67 Scholars
have warned that in the absence of legislative history "[t]he INS,
Immigration Judges, and federal courts appear to be left with little more
than the text of the USA PATRIOT Act and the rule of statutory
construction to guide their interpretation[.],, 68 Statutory interpretation
often involves politics and discerning legislative meaning is highly
contested.69 Unfortunately, those most vulnerable in the rivalry over
statutory interpretation are asylum seekers whose interests are often not
represented in the process.
Furthermore, immigration officers and border patrol agents who first
encounter asylum seekers at the border or at airports sometimes
improperly return asylum seekers who have a legitimate asylum claim.
Arbitrary actions by border patrol agents who flagrantly violate aliens'
human rights, especially those of undocumented workers, and which go
unpunished are well documented.7° While international standards imply
that there is a right to asylum, 71 the United States does not have a policy
of informing individuals of a right to seek refuge in this country.7 The
United States does, however, have a policy of inquiring as to whether an
alien has a fear of returning to her country of nationality.73 A 2005 study
by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom found that
immigration officers not specifically trained to deal with asylum seekers
sometimes improperly preclude individuals from presenting asylum
claims.74
67. Germain, supra note 61, at 512-13.
68. Id. at 517-18.
69. Cheryl Boudreau et al., The Judge as a Fly on the Wall: Interpretive Lessons
from Positive Political Theory, in WHAT Do STATUTES MEAN? 1, 22, 59 (Matthew D.
McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez eds., forthcoming); Cheryl Boudreau et al., 38 Loy.
L. REV. 2131, 2145 (2005).
70. Vargas, supra note 42, at 37-65.
71. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14(1) regarding the right
to seek and enjoy asylum. G.A. Res 217A (1II), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). See also
American Convention on Human Rights, article 22(7), but note that the United States is
not a party to this convention. Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; 9 I.L.M. 99, 107-08
(1969).
72. See Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United
States: The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 303, 319 (2001); Rachel L. Swarns, Rights Groups Criticize Speedy Deportations,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A9.
73. See CHARLES GORDON ET AL., supra note 49.
74. REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 56 at 1, 3-4.
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B. Executive Orders
In the past twenty-five years, detention has been used as a means of
deterring a mass exodus of asylum seekers from Caribbean countries,
especially Cuba and Haiti, from reaching Florida's shores. 75 Detention
and restraints imposed in the 1990s on Cubans and Haitians amounted to
preclusion of the right to seek asylum.76 U.S. immigration officials violated
international treaty obligations by only allowing individuals held at
offshore camps "safe haven," and not allowing asylum seekers to present
their claims of persecution.
In the wake of a mass exodus of refugees from the Caribbean, several
U.S. presidents have issued executive orders to deter those fleeing
Caribbean countries from reaching U.S. shores. There was a mass exodus
of Cubans to the United States in the early 1980s during the Mariel
crisis,7 8 and in July 1994. Former Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton
issued executive orders authorizing the Coast Guard to prevent Cubans
from reaching U.S. shores and empowering local law enforcement to
detain Cubans refugees arriving on the Florida coast. The Coast Guard
intercepted undocumented refugees from Cuba at sea and took them
to Guantanamo. 79 Similarly, former President George H. Bush issued
Executive Order No. 12807 to deter a mass exodus of Haitians by
mandating the direct return of Haitians intercepted at sea.8 ° Around 41,000
75. Koh, supra note 23, at 172. A recent example of the interplay of national
security interests with the deterrence of asylum seekers is Matter of D-J-, 23 I&N Dec.
572 (A.G. 2003). Former Attorney General Ashcroft in Matter of D-J- reversed the
Board of Immigration Appeals' decision to release a detained Haitian asylum seeker on
bond.
[R]elease of such aliens into the United States would come to the attention of
others in Haiti and encourage future surges in illegal migration by sea.
Encouraging such unlawful mass migrations is inconsistent with sound
immigration policy and important national security interests. As substantiated
by the government declarations, surges in such illegal migration by sea injure
national security by diverting valuable Coast Guard and [Department of Defense]
resources from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities.
D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. at 579.
76. Koh, supra note 23, at 164-72.
77. Id. at 168.
78. The 1980 Mariel Crisis involved a mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel harbor
to U.S. shores when Cuban President Fidel Castro lifted the ban prohibiting Cubans from
leaving the island. 1-8 Charles Gordon et al., supra note 49, § 8.09.
79. Koh, supra note 23, at 155.
80. 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (June 1, 1992).
Haitians were interdicted at sea between 1992 and 1994.81 The United
States abandoned its policy of direct return of Haitian refugees around May
1994 as a result of the Congressional Black Caucus' intervention and
mounting domestic pressure.
82
The offshore camps housing Haitians created buffer zones that deprived
Haitians of procedural rights that they would have received upon reaching
U.S. soil. 83  At these offshore camps, INS asylum officers screened
refugees. 4  Credible fear interviews took place aboard Coast Guard
vessels .
Contesting the screening procedures and challenging U.S. violation of
its duty of non-refoulement in federal courts failed.8 The Supreme Court
held in Sale v. Haitian Centers Counci 7 that the screening procedures
complied with the duty of non-refoulement and did not violate the
Constitution. Critics argued that the Court's holding encouraged the
executive branch to continue its policy of offshore refugee camps and
undermined intemational respect for refugees' rights.88 The Court narrowly
interpreted the Refugee Convention's duty of non-refoulement as not
triggered unless an asylum seeker reached U.S. shores.89 The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in an advisory opinion, however, did not
find that the U.S.' duty of non-refoulement was geographically restricted
to refugees who reached U.S. territory.9° A strong argument can be
made that because the duty of non-refoulement has achieved the status
81. Walt Bogdanich & Jenny Nordberg, Mixed U.S. Signals Helped Tilt Haiti
Toward Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 11.
82. Koh, supra note 23, at 153-54.
83. Id. at 139-42.
84. Id. at 143.
85. Id. Credible fear interviews conducted by asylum officers are meant to be non-
adversarial to determine whether the asylum seeker establishes eligibility for asylum,
namely by showing past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.30 (2005) for a current description of credible fear determinations of
stowaways or expedited removal.
86. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1993) (holding that Haitians detained outside the U.S. could not
challenge the screening process).
87. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
88. Koh, supra note 23, at 158; Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 15 (explaining that in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council "the Court pointedly ignored the UNHCR's explication
of the plain text of Article 33 [of the Refugee Protocol], along with [the UNHCR's]
emphasis on the deleterious impact a restrictive territorial reading of Article 33 could
have on the international refugee regime").
89. See Koh, supra note 23, at 169-70.
90. Haitian Ctr. for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Report No.
51/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/VII.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 550, 157 (1997) ("The
Commission shares the view advanced by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees in its Amicus Curiae brief in its argument before the Supreme Court [in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council], that Article 33 had no geographical limitations.").
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of customary international law, the U.S. policy of interdicting refugees
at sea violates its duty of non-refoulement.
Executive orders to deter a mass exodus of refugees are powerful
instruments that the judiciary has left unchecked. As a result, asylum
seekers and refugees have fewer protections when attempting to reach
the United States by sea. The United States has the right to secure the
nation's borders, but, that right must be balanced with the duty to
provide safe haven consistent with international obligations.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM
To qualify for asylum, the asylum seeker must show that she meets the
definition of a refugee as defined in INA section 101(a)(42)(A),9" which
codifies the definition found in the Refugee Convention. A refugee is
defined as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
92
Eligibility for asylum can be established by either past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution.93 Asylum is a discretionary
form of relief from deportation and an asylum seeker must satisfy a host
of stringent substantive and procedural requirements.94
To show past persecution the alien must establish that she was
persecuted by her country's government or by a group the government
could not control.95 Assessing persecution is highly fact intensive and
immigration judges evaluate it based on a totality of the circumstances.96
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2005).
92. Id.
93. Id.; See Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16-17 (BIA 1989).
94. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2005) and 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2005). See generally
ANKER, supra note 39, at app. A (providing a step-by-step account of asylum procedures).
95. See ANKER, supra note 39, at 50-51 (highlighting the importance of case-by-
case adjudication to assess whether there is sufficient evidence of past persecution); see
also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2005).
96. The Ninth Circuit has defined persecution as "oppression, which is inflicted on
groups of individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will not tolerate." Desir
v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th
Cir. 1969)). See, e.g., Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1999)
If an alien shows past R ersecution, she establishes a rebuttable presumption
of future persecution. The DHS can rebut the presumption by showing
that country conditions have changed such that that the alien no longer
has a well-founded fear.
98
The Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca noted that because the
term well-founded fear is ambiguous, it "can only be given concrete
meaning through a process of case by case adjudication." 99 An asylum
seeker must present direct, credible, and specific evidence of a reasonable
fear of persecution.100 The reasonableness of the fear requires an
objective (the reasonable person standard) and subjective (genuine fear)
component.101
Before Congress passed REAL ID, an individual had to show only
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution linked to one
of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. Following REAL ID, however, an asylum
seeker must establish one of the five grounds "was or will be at least one
central reason for persecuting the applicant."'
0 2
Despite providing thousands of individuals fleeing persecution each
year with an opportunity to create a new life, the U.S. asylum process is
flawed. 10 3 There are structural deficiencies, including an initial screening
process conducted at airports and border crossing stations by immigration
officials who are given conflicting duties of excluding individuals who
(multiple beatings accompanied by statements of ethnic hatred and death threats
constitutes persecution). Threats to one's life or freedom are always considered persecution.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428, n.22 (1984). Economic harm can rise to the level of
persecution in cases where a "deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage" is
demonstrated on account of a person's race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion. Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir.
2000) (quoting Kovac, 407 F.2d at 107).
97. Chen, 20 I&N Dec. at 18; see 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2005).
98. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995).
99. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
100. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439, 443-445 (BIA 1987).
101. Id.
102. See 8 U.S.C. § I1 58(b)(l)(B)(i) (2005).
103. See supra at 226. For fiscal year 2004, immigration judges received 56,609
asylum cases and granted asylum in 10,839 cases. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ExECUTivE
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECHNOLOGY,
IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2004 ASYLUM STATISTICS at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/
FY04AsyStats.pdf. In 2004, the USCIS approved 10,101 affirmative asylum cases.
That same year, of the asylum cases referred to an immigration judge for adjudication
12,712 had been previously interviewed by an asylum officer and 3,833 had not been
interviewed. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
51, 58 (Jan. 2006). Statistics of asylum approvals or denials should be interpreted with
caution. Figures usually do not indicate whether the adjudicator is considering the merits
of an asylum case for the first time, or if the case was referred to an immigration judge
by an asylum officer who determined that the asylum seeker did not establish a credible
fear of persecution.
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have no legal right to enter the United States and simultaneously making
a preliminary assessment of whether individuals fear returning to their
country.' 0 4 Immigration courts are understaffed, immigration judges have
heavy caseloads and often have to rely on inadequate documentation,
and many asylum seekers do not have legal representation.'0 5 Those
asylum seekers that do have an attorney often do not receive effective
assistance of counsel as they may be represented by an unscrupulous
individual posing as an attorney or the asylum seeker's attorney may
provide unreasonable legal representation.' 06 Recent changes have practically
eliminated administrative appellate review of immigration judges'
decisions. 10 Furthermore, the system produces inconsistent final outcomes
as judicial review of immigration judges' decisions varies depending
upon the federal circuit court reviewing the decision and asylum grant
rates vary greatly.'0 8 As a result, segments of the U.S. asylum system do
not conform with international obligations as evidenced by an asylum
process that produces inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary results and
fails to provide sufficient procedural safeguards to comply with the duty
of non-refoulement.
A. Filing a Defensive Asylum Application
There are three ways to file an asylum application: 1) an affirmative
application filed within one year of entering the United States with the
Asylum Office under the jurisdiction of the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services ("USCIS");' 09 2) a defensive application
104. See infra at 231-32.
105. See infra at 230.
106. See Anna M. Simmons, Immigrants Exploited by "Notarios", L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2004, at B1. The requirements for filing an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in immigration proceedings are set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637
(BIA 1988).
107. See infra at 229.
108. See discussion supra notes 11-12; Pamela A. MacLean, Wide Disparities Are
Found in Granting Asylum, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 14, 2006, at 1 ("A comprehensive analysis
of nearly 300,000 asylum decision by 208 judges over the last five years shows wide
disparities in granting asylum, from a low 3%... to a high of 89%[.]") These statistics
are somewhat misleading as they fail to distinguish between denials on the merits and
those where the asylum seeker is statutorily ineligible for relief. Further, these statistics
do not reflect the differences in the volume and types of asylum cases based on the
geographic location of the immigration court.
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) & (b)(l) (2005). Note that the Asylum Office can approve,
deny, or refer asylum application to an immigration judge for adjudication. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14
(2005). See AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
during removal proceedings filed with an immigration judge;110 3) a
defensive application filed at the border during expedited removal
proceedings." I I This Comment will focus on defensive asylum applications.
The DHS commences removal proceedings by issuing an alien a
charging document. 12 The hearing before the immigration judge is a
due process hearing." 3 The immigration judge, as the Attomey General's
delegate, may grant or deny asylum. 14 If an asylum seeker is considered an
arriving alien, she is placed in expedited removal proceedings under
INA section 235(b)(1) and may be detained for the course of the
proceedings."l 5 If an asylum seeker has already been admitted to the
United States or establishes that she has been living in the United States
continuously for 2 years before the date she was determined inadmissible,
she is placed in removal proceedings under INA section 240, which contains
greater procedural safeguards than expedited removal proceedings." 
6
As related to asylum seekers, a major distinction between removal
proceedings and expedited removal proceedings is that in the latter an
asylum seeker must first pass a credible fear interview with an asylum
officer before being entitled to a due process hearing before an immigration
judge. 17 The credible fear interview before a USCIS asylum officer is
non-adversarial, whereas, the hearing is adversarial before an immigration
judge. 118
Although the proceedings are civil proceedings, the consequences can
be severe. While an asylum seeker can hire counsel to appear at the
asylum interview with USCIS or during removal proceedings before the
Immigration Court, which is under the Executive Office for Immigration
Review ("EOIR"), an agency within the Justice Department, counsel
AFFAIRS ASYLUM DivIsioN (Feb. 2003) (describing the processing of affirmative asylum
applications by the asylum office).
110. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.2, 1208.4 (2005).
111. See 3-34 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49 at § 34.02. For a description of
expedited removal see supra at 218-19.
112. 8 C.F.R. § 239 (2005).
113. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see 3-34 GORDON ET AL., supra note
49, at § 34.02; see id. at 1-9, § 9.06 (outlining the minimum requirements of due process
proceedings based on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
which requires a court to consider (1) the individual's interest that will be
affected by official action; (2) risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
through establishing procedures, and the gain to decisionmaking accuracy of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's
interest, including administrative and fiscal costs, in avoiding the burdens of
the proposed new safeguards).
114. 3-34 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, at § 34.02.
115. Id.; see Craig Haney, supra note 54, at 197-99.
116. See 3-34 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, at § 34.02.
117. ANKER, supra note 39, at app. A.
118. See 3-34 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, at § 34.02.
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will not be provided at government expense. 1 9 Many asylum seekers
are unable to afford an attorney and must navigate the process without
the assistance of counsel, which significantly reduces the chances of a
successful asylum claim.' 20 "During [Fiscal Year] 1999-2003, only forty-
two to forty-eight percent of non-citizens had representation." 12' A
study has found that in cases where asylum applications are referred to
the Immigration Court, asylum seekers are six times more likely to be
granted asylum if they have an attorney.'
22
As discussed in this section, asylum seekers must overcome many
procedural and administrative hurdles including: 1) the complexity of
the asylum system; 2) lack of legal representation and difficulty finding
a qualified attorney; 3) a merits hearing on the asylum claim which often
yields inconsistent results; and 4) lack of significant judicial review of a
discretionary determination by the adjudicator.
B. Overhauling Executive Agencies
Until the Refugee Act of 1980 added INA section 208, asylum was an
informal procedure administered by the INS without direct statutory
authority. 
23
The Refugee Act of 1980 adopted from the [Refugee] Convention the definition
of 'refugee,' which lies at the core of both asylum and refugee status, and the
Convention's fundamental obligation of protection against return or non-
refoulement that forms the basis of the U.S. statutory withholding of removal
protection. 1
2 4
Before 1980, "[t]he courts concluded that the INS's asylum procedure
created no new rights, but merely implemented existing rights under the
INA and the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and the 1967 United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees[.]"'
25
119. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2005) regarding credible fear interviews and 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.10 (2005) regarding removal proceedings.
120. See Schoenholtz, supra note 33, at 351.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Pub. L. No. 96-212 § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102 (1980); see Deborah Anker &
Michael Posner, The Forty-Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980,
19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1986).
124. ANKER,supra note 34, at3.
125. 3-33 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, at § 33.05.
After 1980, INA section 208 provided direct statutory authority for
asylum, authorizing the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum.
26
As administrative law, asylum law and procedures traverse several federal
agencies, most notably DHS and EOIR, which is within the Justice
Department. 127 Since 2003 the Secretary of Homeland Security also has
authority to delegate some powers relating to the granting of affirmative
asylum applications and detention to various DHS components, including
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS")
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").
28
1. Dismantling the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Calls to reform the INS, the primary agency charged with enforcement
activities, which had become an unmanageable bureaucracy, grew throughout
the 1990s. 129 The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center
triggered the formation of a new executive agency charged with overseeing
immigration and border security to replace the INS. 130 Commentators
are skeptical that the new executive agency will significantly overhaul
the inefficient administration of immigration and asylum law and
procedures.131
2. The Board of Immigration Appeals Has Become a "Rubber Stamp"
Critics denounced former Attorney General Ashcroft's policies aimed
at reducing the backlog of immigration cases as having effectively
eliminated the administrative appeal process.132  Under Ashcroft, the
126. INA § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005), sets forth that: "The Secretary of
Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien..." (emphasis
added); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2005); see also Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N
Dec. 357 (BIA 1996).
127. See Executive Office of Immigration Review, Background Information, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/background.htm (last visited October 24, 2006); see generally
USCIS, INS to DHS Roadmap, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/othergov/
roadmap.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
128. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 100.2 and 103 (2005). For jurisdiction in asylum
cases, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (2005). See also 1-1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, at
§ 1.02; INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2005) has been amended to reflect that the
Secretary of Homeland Security has authority to grant asylum.
129. See Thomas W. Donovan, The American Immigration System: A Structural
Change With a Different Emphasis, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 574, 577-78 (2005).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 592.
132. Eleanor Acer, Fairness Sacrificed Recent Changes to the U.S. Asylum System,
in 24 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 163, 164 (Joseph Fugolo ed., 2003). But see John R.B.
Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals
Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for
Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 94 ("appeal rate has increased as a result of a surge in
230
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number of judges at the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") was
halved and procedures were implemented to allow "affirmance without
opinion," also known as summary affirmance, of the immigration
judge's findings. 133 The number of cases where the BIA granted asylum
on appeal declined. 134 Federal appellate courts have held that BIA policies
for streamlining appeals do not violate due process. 135
An asylum seeker can appeal an immigration judge's denial of asylum
to the BIA. "Historically, the BIA has been the single most important
decision-maker in the immigration system. It reviews cases nationwide
and sets precedents that immigration judges and asylum officers must
follow."' 6 The absence of effective appellate review of administrative
law decisions by the BIA has had a major impact on U.S. immigration
and asylum law. Seventh Circuit Judge Diane P. Wood has referred to
the BIA as a "rubber stamp" because the BIA often does not reveal how
it reached its decision.
3 7
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, among other circuits that have seen a huge
increase of immigration cases in their dockets, criticized the state of the
record when it reaches the Court and the BIA's summary affirmance
policy. 38 The majority of Ashcroft's changes at the BIA were driven in
part by a desire to reduce the backlog of cases; some had been pending
BIA decisions that leave non-detained aliens with final expulsion orders and a
fundamental shift in behavior among lawyers and their clients, causing them to focus
their litigation in the courts of appeals for the first time").
133. Acer, supra note 132 (discussing reduction in the number of judges at the BIA
from 23 to 11 and describing the increased use of immigration judges' decisions
receiving "affirmance without an opinion" by the BIA).
134. Id.
135. See Zhang v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2004),
citing Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1229-32 (10th Cir. 2004); Loulou v. Ashcroft,
354 F.3d 706, 708-09 (8th Cir. 2003); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 849-52
(9th Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 966-67 (7th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324
F.3d 830, 831-33 (5th Cir. 2003); Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 375-79 (1st Cir.
2003); Khattak v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 250, 252-53 (4th Cir. 2003).
136. Schoenholtz, supra note 33, at 352-53.
137. Changes for Immigration Appeals, CHICAGO LAW., Feb. 2006, at 25.
138. Lisa Getter & Jonathan Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings
Assailed-Ashcroft's Goal To Clear a Backlog of Immigration Appeals Has Board
Members Deciding Cases in Minutes. Increasingly Foreigners Are Losing, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2003 (criticizing Ashcroft's method for reducing backlog of immigration cases);
Mintz, supra note 11.
for up to three years. 139 The delay is even more troubling considering
that many asylum seekers are detained pending the final outcome of their
case. Onerous delays adjudicating asylum applications and allegations of
systemic bias have also led to class action lawsuits, like the ABC
settlement in 1995 which required the INS to readjudicate the asylum
claims of certain Salvadorans and Guatemalans who alleged INS
policies and practices violated equal protection.
40
Attorney General Gonzales recently increased the number of judges
on staff at the BIA in response to the growing dissatisfaction among
circuit court judges with the lack of administrative appellate review.141
3. Scrutinizing Immigration Judges
For the past couple years immigration judges have come under
increased attack by the judiciary, especially by justices in Ninth and
Third Circuits who are frustrated with the heavy immigration caseloads
and the shoddy state of the record when it reaches the circuit courts of
appeals. There are approximately 215 immigration judges in the United
States who are responsible for around "300,000 cases a year-an
average of 1,395 each.' 42 Federal appellate judges have condemned the
poor quality of the immigration record on appeal and immigration
judges' lack of adequate consideration of asylum cases. 4 3 However, some
commentators familiar with the caseload pressures on immigration
139. Department of Justice, Proposed Rule Board oflmmigration Appeals: Procedural
Reforms to Improve Case Management, AG Order No. 2559-2002, RIN 1125-AA36,
EOIR 131P, 67 Fed. Reg. 7309 (Feb. 19, 2002).
140. American Baptist Churches v. Thomburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799-800 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); see Smith & the ABC Legal Team, The ABC Settlement: A Guide for Class
Members and Advocates, 72 Interpreter Releases 1497 (Nov. 6, 1995).
141. Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judges Facing Yearly Performance Reviews,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at A14.
142. Schwartz, supra note 12. For fiscal year 2005, immigration judges received
50,753 asylum cases and granted asylum in 10,164 cases. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND
TECHNOLOGY, IMMIGRATION COURTS FY 2005 ASYLUM STATISTICS, at http://www.usdoj.
gov/eoir/efoia/FY05AsyStats.pdf. See Dory Mitros Durham, The Once and Future
Judge: The Rise and Fall (and Rise?) of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2006).
143. See Pamela A. MacLean, Immigration Bench Plagued by Flaws: Due Process
Abuse, Bad Records Alleged, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 2006, at 1; Pamela A. MacLean,
Immigration Judges Come Under Fire, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 30, 2006, at 1; Pamela A.
MacLean, Judges Blast Immigration Rulings, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 2005, at S1. See also
Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, Overwhelmed Circuit Courts Lashing Out at the BIA and
Selected Immigration Judges: Is Streamlining to Blame?, 82 No.48 Interpreter Releases
2005, Dec. 19, 2005; Pamela A. MacLean, supra note 108.
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judges to render oral decisions at the end of proceedings highlight the
structural constraints on the nation's Immigration Courts.
144
In January 2006, Attorney General Gonzales ordered an investigation
of the immigration courts, specifically focusing on the immigration
judges and the BIA. 4 5 Attorney General Gonzales announced in August
2006 that immigration judges that were selected in the future would be
required to pass an exam in immigration law. 146  In addition, all
immigration judges will be subject to performance evaluations, however,
it is still not certain how the process will be administered. 1
47
C. Assessing Asylum-Seekers' Credibility
As discussed at the beginning of section II, an asylum seeker has the
burden of proof to show that he has suffered "past persecution" or has a
"well-founded fear" of future persecution.1 48 These standards are highly
fact specific, require consideration of a totality of the circumstances, and
are adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. Increasingly the U.S. public has
become suspicious of asylum seekers viewing many as either undeserving,
trying to manipulate U.S. laws to gain entry and burden public services,
or terrorists seeking to harm the United States. 149 Several commentators
have noted that the Refugee Convention grew out of a concern with
relocating post-war Europe and that as the number of refugees from
countries other than Europe continued to grow, vast barriers were created to
stem the flow from non-European countries. 50 In this era of increased
focus on national security, many wonder how much longer Westernized
countries will provide safe haven to those fleeing persecution.
144. See Schoenholtz, supra note 33, at 356.
145. Howard Mintz, US. Attorney General: Court Must Stop Mistreating Immigrants,
S.J. MERCURY-NEWS, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al.
146. Bernstein, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2005).
149. See Schoenholtz, supra note 33; see generally SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN,
LEGALIZING MOVES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS' STRUGGLE FOR U.S. RESIDENCY 10-13
(2000). Fear of fraudulent applications is not limited to asylum claims. A Special
Agricultural Worker ("SAW") provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), which granted amnesty to certain
agricultural worker is often cited as a prime example of the problem with fraudulent
applications. However, by far the most prevalent fraud in the SAW program was
committed by farm labor contractors or farm owners who sold their affidavits to aliens.
150. See Jerzy Sztucki, Who is a Refugee? The Convention Definition: Universal or
Obsolete?, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS
AND REGIMES 55 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
Asylum officers' bias against asylum seekers undermined the reliability
of asylum officers' credible fear determinations prompting the DHS to
implement anti-bias training for asylum officers. 151 The documentary
Well-Founded Fear excellently portrays some major problems with the
asylum system such as the differing worldviews of asylum seekers and
asylum officers who often perfunctorily assess credibility with an unrealistic
expectation that asylum seekers will be able to provide corroborating
evidence. 152
Given the widespread doubts about the truthfulness of asylum seekers'
claims of past persecution or fear of future persecution, and bias affecting
decision-makers, one commentator has advocated establishing a presumption
of credibility.' 53 The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
("USCIRF") found that immigration officials involved at the initial stages
of asylum processing did not properly document their screening of
asylum seekers' claims and that this inadequate documentation negatively
impacted asylum seekers' credibility determination later in the process.'
4
The USCIRF's experts specifically found that immigration judges frequently
cited to these unreliable and incomplete documents when denying
asylum. 55  In a confidential study on expedited removal, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") found that:
151. U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 38-39
(May 2002) (discussing the implementation of anti-bias training in response to abuses by
asylum officers).
152. Well-Founded Fear (PBS television broadcast, June 5, 2000). More information
about this documentary is available at http://www.pbs.org/pov/pov1999/wellfoundedfear/
home.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
153. Ilene Durst, Lost In Translation: Why Due Process Demands Deference to the
Refugee's Narrative, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 127 (2000) (advocating a presumption of credibility
to individuals seeking asylum because of the biases that the average adjudicator harbors
prevents a fair credibility evaluation). "[A] refugee's testimony should not be rejected in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence of material misrepresentations." Id. at 128.
154. USCIRF is a federal government commission, created by Congress in 1998, to
monitor religious freedom around the world and advise the President, the Secretary of
State, and Congress on religious freedom. Under the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat 2787 (1998),
Congress authorized the USCIRF to appoint experts to examine whether
immigration officers, in exercising Expedited Removal authority over aliens
who may be eligible for asylum, were:
(1) Improperly encouraging withdrawals of applications for admission;
(2) Incorrectly failing to refer such aliens for credible fear
determinations;
(3) Incorrectly removing such aliens to countries where such aliens may
face persecution; or
(4) Improperly detaining such aliens, or detaining them under
inappropriate conditions.
REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 56, at 1, 3-4.
155. Id. at 5.
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[m]any [airport] inspectors held negative views of asylum seekers, considering
them to be frauds. The report concluded that this attitude resulted in instances
where inspectors intimidated asylum seekers or treated them with derision. 
156
Fear of fraudulent asylum claims, a potential bias, adversely affects
neutral evaluation of asylum seekers' credibility.
To combat fraud, asylum restrictionists advocated the increased
reliance on statutory bars to preclude reaching the merits of asylum
seekers' claims. Restrictionists argue that an asylum seeker who genuinely
fears for her life would immediately, or within a reasonable time deemed
to be one year, apply for asylum. 157 Asylum seekers must show by "clear
and convincing evidence" that their application was filed within one year
of arriving in the United States. 158 Absent extraordinary circumstances
or changed conditions, an asylum seeker who misses the one year filing
deadline will not be eligible for asylum. 159 Thus, a factor that may reflect
credibility, the amount of time elapsed before applying for asylum, is
now being used to preclude reaching the merits of an asylum claim.
Such an expansion of statutory bars to asylum is contrary to international
standards recognizing a right to asylum.
60
The UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status ("Handbook"),161 states that credibility doubts should be
resolved in favor of the asylum seeker. Numerous factors affect an
evaluation of an asylum seeker's credibility, including "differences in
cultural norms, the effect of an asylum seeker's past traumatic
experiences and flight on her ability to recall events, language barriers,
the adversarial nature of the hearing, the asylum seeker's limited access to
156. Schoenholtz, supra note 33, at 333 (citing Rachel L. Swarns, U.N. Report Cites
Harassment at American Airports of Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at
All).
157. Schoenholtz, supra note 33, at 333.
158. IIRIRA imposed the statutory bar on asylum applications requiring filing
within one year of arrival in the United States. See INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B) (2005).
159. See id. Opponents of the one year filing bar note that while its purpose was to
discourage fraudulent asylum claims, immigration judges and asylum officers' restrictive
interpretation has produced numerous denials of bona fide asylum claims. Leena
Khandwala et al., The One- Year Bar: Denying Protection to Bona Fide Refugees, Contrary to
Congressional Intent and Violative of International Law, 05-08 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1
(Aug. 2005).
160. Coffey, supra note 72.
161. Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES,
HCR/IP/4/ENG/REV. 1 (re-edited 1992) 196 [hereinafter "HANDBOOK"].
legal counsel, and the adjudicator's sometimes inaccurate perceptions of
foreign culture and politics.' ' 162 The proliferation of more stringent
requirements for corroborating evidence 63 runs contrary to UNHCR
guidance.
While the Supreme Court has upheld the persuasive authority of
UNHCR documents, 164 they are not binding on U.S. courts. 165 There is
some effort to comply with the UNHCR as the organization's sources
are persuasive. However, the degree of persuasiveness of UNHCR
materials or how international law will be treated by Congress or in U.S.
courts is debatable. A recent example of the limitation of relying on
international treaties, such as the Convention Against Torture, to
advance international law principles is the failure to have Congress pass
legislation banning the torture of detainees suspected of terrorism.
166
Nonetheless, the United States continues to recognize a commitment to
the UNHCR as evidenced by its over $200 million dollar contribution to
support the organization's 2006 operations. 1
67
D. Detention ofAsylum-Seekers
INA sections 208 and 235 authorize the detention of asylum seekers
who request asylum at the border or airport or who are placed in removal
proceedings before an immigration judge. The policy of detaining
asylum seekers aims to discourage large numbers of refugees from
arriving on U.S. shores.' 68 DHS 169 has broad discretion to determine based
on humanitarian reasons whether to parole an asylum seeker into the
162. ANKER, supra note 39, at 153.
163. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 109-072, supra note 10 (listing heightened
credibility standards enacted in REAL ID).
164. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,438-39 (1987).
165. INS v. Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1999) ("U.N. Handbook may be a
useful interpretive aid, but it is not binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or United
States courts.").
166. See, e.g., Carl Hulse & Eric Schmitt, Negotiators Say Differences Over Ban on
Abuse Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at A19. See also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BEHIND
THE WIRE (March 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/PDF/
behind-the-wire-033005.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2006). Besides international treaties on
the subject, the failure to ban torture of detainees is even more troubling considering that
the ban on torture is ajus cogens, a mandatory norm of international law.
167. U.S. Contributes $203.8 Million to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, State Department website, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60788.htm
(last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
168. See ANN VIBELKE EGGLI, MASS REFUGEE INFLUX AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002).
169. DHS took over INS functions in 2003; see supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
[VOL. 8: 209, 2006] U.S. Asylum Law
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
country.170 DHS also has broad discretion to set the amount of bond that
the asylum seekers should post in the event that the agency determines
that they can be paroled into the country. Moreover, the anti-terrorism
provisions in the Patriot Act 7 1 gives the Attorney General and Secretary
of Homeland Security "unprecedented power to detain aliens without a
hearing and without a showing that they pose a threat to national security
or a flight risk."
' 172
Prolonged detention has a harmful psychological effect on asylum
seekers and violates international law. 173 Furthermore, policies and
procedures for detaining asylum seekers awaiting adjudication of their
applications are not uniform across the country. 174  For example, in
Miami "release is the norm (unless you are Haitian) [whereas] [i]n New
York, [requirements for] release [are] much more stringent[.]' 175  In
addition, a blanket detention policy, known as Operation Liberty Shield,
has resulted in the prolonged detention of nationals from 34 countries
deemed sympathetic to Al Qaeda. 176 Some of the countries included in
the blanket detention policy are countries from which many people flee
persecution, including Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Iraq.1
77
Human Rights First documented difficulties that asylum seekers face
in expedited removal procedures and in immigration jails in its January
2004 report In Liberty's Shadow: U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers in
the Era of Homeland Security.178 The USCIRF, after extensive study,
"found that asylum seekers are consistently detained in jails or jail-like
170. Wendy Young, Detention of Asylum Seeking Minors, in 24 IN DEFENSE OF THE
ALIEN 121, 123 (Joseph Fugolo ed., 2003).
171. Title IV, § 412(a) of the Patriot Act amended 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a) (2001),
which is titled "Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists."
172. Cole, supra note 7, at 971.
173. AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: DETENTION
OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS 39-44, 54-59 (1999) (unaccompanied minors are detained and
under the care of the State Department's Office of Refugee Resettlement); MARK Dow,
AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 1-19 (2004).
174. Young, supra note 170.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 124.
177. Id.
178. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW: U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN THE ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/liberysshadow/LibertysShadow.pdf (last visited Oct. 17,
2006) [hereinafter "U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE ERA OF HOMELAND
SECURITY"].
facilities, which the experts found inappropriate for non-criminal asylum
seekers."' 7 9 The USCIRF and Human Rights First recommend that DHS
create a high-level refugee and asylum protection position and formal
regulations to ensure that those seeking asylum are not needlessly
jailed.180
A major flaw of the expedited removal system is that DHS' power to
detain and determine who has a credible fear of returning to their
country of origin is unchecked and there are insufficient safeguards for
asylum seekers. 8' The detention of asylum seekers who are considered
arriving aliens because they arrive at U.S. ports-of-entry without valid
documentation to enter the United States dates back at least as far as
IIRIRA. 182 The "expedited removal" provisions of that law, which went
into effect in April 1997, have resulted in lengthy detentions of asylum
seekers who flee to the United States without valid travel documents. 1
83
In addition, the growth in the number of people detained by DHS has
outpaced detention space at DHS facilities. In response, DHS has obtained
bed space with private detention facilities and jails. 84 Commentators
have noted the disparity between the treatment of detainees at DHS
facilities versus the sub-standard treatment of them at private facilities or
jails.' 85 Public scrutiny of the 9/11 investigation concerning the treatment
of immigration detainees prompted an Inspector General's report, which
found numerous violations of detainee processing.' 
86
The Patriot Act allowed for the mandatory detention of aliens certified
by the Attorney General. 87  However, in 2001 Zadvydas v. Davis
88
179. REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 56, at 4.
180. Id. at 5; U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE ERA OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, supra note 178.
181. Erin M. O'Callaghan, Expedited Removal and Discrimination in the Asylum
Process: the Use of Humanitarian Aid as a Political Tool, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1747, 1748 (2002). "The problems [with the expedited removal process] stem from the
true refugee's lack of reviewability after being rejected from the system, coupled with
the inadequacy of the system to deal with new forms or sources of persecution." Id. at
1770.
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1996) [INA § 235(b)(l)(B)].
183. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/
reports/dueprocess/dueprocess.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
184. Smith, supra note 55, at 788.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 789-90. The federal government has paid $300,000 to settle a lawsuit
brought by a detainee who was abused and held for months at a federal detention center
in Brooklyn, which is one of the sites described in the Inspector General's 2003 report.
Nina Bernstein, U.S. Is Settling Detainee's Suit in 9/11 Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2006, at Al.
187. Cole, supra note 7, at 971.
188. 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (extended to apply to inadmissible aliens by Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005)).
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altered DHS detention policies and procedures when an immigration
judge issues an order of removal and the alien has been detained beyond
the 90-day removal period. 189 The Supreme Court held that DHS may
only detain aliens beyond the 90-day removal period for a time
reasonably necessary to effectuate the alien's repatriation. The Court
established six months as the default for a reasonable period. 190 Even
after six months, DHS is not required to release the detained alien unless
"there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future."''9 The Court's holding did not address aliens who
pose a national security risk "where special arguments might be made
for forms of preventative detention and for heightened deference to the
judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national
security."'
92
E. Due Process and Restricting Judicial Review
1. Due Process and the Asylum System
Providing an overview of the U.S. asylum system requires an
examination of the procedural fairness of the process and the role of
judicial review. In filing defensive asylum applications, asylum seekers
are often in a legal limbo because they are physically present in the
United States, often in federal custody, but they have not been admitted
into the country for purposes of legal protection. 193 As such, the asylum
seeker detained at the border may not be entitled to the same level of
constitutional due process as an asylum seeker who was admitted to the
United States on a tourist visa and filed an affirmative asylum application
with the USCIS. This concept of a legal limbo status refers to the entry
fiction doctrine where courts treat aliens who are physically present on
U.S. soil as outside the United States for purposes of legal protections.
189. Rachel Canty, The New World of Immigration Custody Determinations after
Zadvydas v. Davis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 467, 482 (2004). See Determination of
Whether There Is a Significant Likelihood of Removing a Detained Alien in the
Reasonably Foreseeable Future, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2005).
190. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 696.
193. Allison Wexler, Note, The Murky Depths of the Entry Fiction Doctrine: The
Plight of Inadmissible Aliens Post-Zadvydas, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 2029, 2034 (2004)
("These individuals, waylaid at the country's boundaries, may be detained within the
United States awaiting removal, but are not considered 'within' the country for due
process purposes.").
Until 1996, "entry" constituted the dividing line between those aliens who
received a constitutional right to procedural due process, and those who did not.
An alien's legal standing, his access to the court system and claim to
constitutional rights were contingent on whether the alien was considered to
have "entered" the country. However, the Supreme Court has held that mere
physical presence within the United States is not always enough to qualify an
alien as having entered the United States. 1
94
Following IIRIRA in 1996, the term "entry" was replaced with the term
",admitted." 95
While the Supreme Court recognized in Zadvydas that a person in the
United States regardless of legal status is protected by constitutional due
process, this protection does not apply to an alien who is considered to
have not "entered" or been "admitted" to the United States.' 96 Thus, an
asylum seeker who applied for asylum at the border or airport and has
been paroled or detained pending her asylum proceedings has not been
"admitted." Such an asylum seeker is only entitled to the due process
afforded her by Congress. 97 Asylum and immigration law is an area where
the Supreme Court's adherence to the plenary power doctrine and deference
to congressional decision-making is particularly strong. 98
In the U.S. asylum is not construed as a right, but rather, a privilege.'99
As such, the Eleventh Circuit remarked that "[a]liens seeking admission
to the United States therefore have no constitutional rights with regard to
their applications and must be content to accept whatever statutory rights
and privileges are granted by Congress. ' 200 The procedural fairness of
the asylum system is at the mercy of legislators who are often influenced
by groups seeking to further restrict asylum laws. In addition, one legal
scholar has underscored that the Supreme Court's deference to the
legislative branch because of the plenary power doctrine and increased
reliance on the procedural due process exception has led to the absence201 ,
of substantive constitutional scrutiny in asylum matters. 0 "Heavy reliance
on procedural due process also prompts Congress and judges ... to search
for ways to limit the group of aliens entitled to invoke it, such as creating
more restrictive 'substantive' exclusion and deportation categories.'
2
194. Id. at 2038 (citations omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2058.
198. See id
199. Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982). Plascencia "marked the arrival of the
due process revolution [following Mathews v. Eldridge] in immigration law." Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1652 (1992).
200. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (11th Cir. 1984). See Coffey, supra note
72.
201. Motomura, supra note 199, at 1628-30.
202. Id. at 1701.
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Thus, the one year statutory bar to filing asylum claims provides a
poignant example of how a "procedure" may preclude a "substantive"
right of presenting an asylum claim. An immigration judge's decision
that an asylum claim is barred because of failure to meet the one year
filing requirement is not reviewable.
20 3
The requirements of due process are flexible and contingent upon the
circumstances of the case or proceeding.20 4 At a minimum, however,
under federal agency regulations, asylum seekers must be notified of the
charges against them, have a right to a fair hearing, including presenting
witnesses, have a right to adequate translation of the proceedings, and
have a right to appeal.205 Federal appellate jud§es have held that many
asylum seekers have been denied a fair hearing.
2. Restricting Judicial Review
IIRIRA 207 and AEDPA 208 restricted judicial review of deportation
decisions and narrowed the class of aliens eligible for a discretionary
waiver of deportation. IIRIRA "repealed the INA's section on judicial
review and eliminated judicial review for criminal aliens. 20 9 This law
also raised the standard of review for reversing the immigration judge's
findings to if a "reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary., 2 10 Commentators highlighted the "lack of administrative
and judicial review" in expedited removal as a highly controversial
203. Khandwala et al., supra note 159.
204. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
205. See 1-9 GORDON ET AL., supra note 49, at § 9.06; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.12-42
(2006) (listing Immigration Court rules of procedure).
206. For examples of due process violations from denial of a fair hearing, see
Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2000) (petitioner precluded from
testifying on key issues); Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 728-32 (9th Cir. 2000)
(immigration judge inadequately explained the procedures of the hearing to an
unrepresented alien, failed to inform her she had a right to counsel and to present
testimony, and failed to explain any of her rights); Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d
1017, 1021 (9th Cir.1992) (precluded from presenting rebuttal evidence in asylum
hearing); Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 968 (5th Cir.1991) (same). See also supra
text accompanying note 143.
207. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
208. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). AEDPA "eliminated judicial
review of deportation based on aggravated felonies, drug convictions, crimes of moral
turpitude, and other crimes, even for long-term permanent residents." Lofgren, supra
note 46, at 368.
209. Lofgren, supra note 46, at 369.
210. Id.
provision of IIRIRA. 21 INA section 208(a)(3) sets forth: "No court shall
have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General
under [section 208(a)(2)]."
Four years after IIRIRA's enactment, the Supreme Court in a five to
four decision in INS v. St. Cyr212 examined Congress' intent in IIRIRA
and AEDPA. The Court determined that it still had habeas jurisdiction
in immigration cases, under the general habeas corpus statute.213  A
scholar in the immigration law field welcomed the Court's decision
suggesting that it marked a retreat from the judiciary's long-standing
deference to legislative and executive pronouncements in immigration
regulation.214 Another saw the Court's decision as leading to potential
misuse by individuals trying to frivolously delay the deportation process.
21 5
Judicial review in the immigration and asylum context is critically
important to counteract the court's traditional deference to Congress
under the plenary power doctrine.216 One legal scholar has noted that
"procedural due process has served... as a 'surrogate' for the substantive
judicial review that the plenary power doctrine seems to bar., 217 Three
factors influence the decline of judicial review in immigration cases:
"external influences on judicial decisionmaking in the immigration
context; the (qualified) political advantages to elected representatives in
taking a 'tough' line on immigration; and legitimate, but sometimes
overstated, concerns about the fiscal and institutional costs of judicial
review. '218 In reviewing the erosion of judicial review in the wake of
AEDPA and IIRIRA, one legal scholar concludes that judicial review
serves as a check on the administrative adjudicator and plays a pivotal
role in guaranteeing "procedural justice. '219 Congresswoman Lofgren in
analyzing the past decade of "radical change in immigration law" explains
that an irony of the restriction of judicial review is that in cases where it
remains "aliens have taken great advantage of it because administrative
relief is so limited.,
220
211. Benson, supra 51, at 1449.
212. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
213. Id. at 313-16, 326. The general habeas statute is located in 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(2005).
214. Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy
in the Midst of Litigation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 271 (2002).
215. David A. Martin, Behind the Scenes on a Different Set: What Congress Needs
to do in the Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2002).
216. Stephen Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1615, 1616 (2000); see also Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
217. Motomura, supra note 200, at 1628.
218. Legomsky, supra note 216, at 1624-25.
219. Id. at 1631-32.
220. Lofgren supra note 46, at 370.
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An aspect of procedural justice often overlooked is appellate judges'
role in creating precedential decisions by deciding whether to issue a
published or unpublished opinion. Examining the Ninth Circuit's record
of deciding whether or not to publish asylum decisions, a legal scholar
concluded that "voting and publication, are for some judges, strategically
intertwined: for example, judges may be prepared to acquiesce in decisions
that run contrary to their own preferences, and to vote with the majority,
as long as the decision remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent
if the majority insists upon publication. '" 221 Therefore, an analysis of the
procedural fairness of the asylum process should consider variables
underlying judicial review, including factors like publication that influence
appellate judges' decisionmaking.
IV. THREE RESTRICTIVE PROVISIONS OF REAL ID
REAL ID restricts asylum eligibility.222 REAL ID casts a shadow on
the future of U.S. asylum policy and suggests that future legislation to
restrict asylum under the guise of national security will follow.
223
Congresswoman Lofgren views REAL ID as an unnecessary measure that
will "do[] nothing to make us safer." 224 On the other hand, Congressman
Sensenbrenner, who introduced the legislation, proclaimed that REAL
ID would toughen border security and improve the asylum system thereby
making the country safer.225 Interestingly, former INS Commissioner
Meissner stated that the "asylum system is not a weak link in our
nation's immigration system" and that REAL I) establishes legal burdens
that harm asylum seekers.226  The following section examines three
aspects of REAL ID: the heightened burden of proof, credibility, and
221. David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 820 (2005) ("the publication rate for
asylum appeals in the Ninth Circuit is approximately half the overall publication rate.").
However, the role of publication for establishing precedent in asylum law should not be
over-emphasized as asylum claims require a highly fact intensive analysis on a case-by-
case basis. Id. at 831.
222. REAL ID was enacted May 11, 2005. See supra text accompanying note 2.
223. See Cianciarulo, supra note 37, at 101. "[S]everal areas of poor drafting [in
REAL ID], combined with legislative history mischaracterizing the asylum system as a
haven for terrorists and suicide bombers, may result in the denial of bona fide asylum
applications."
224. Lofgren, supra note 46, at 376.
225. House Passes Real ID, supra note 1.
226. Doris Meissner, Not Broke, Don't Fix, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2005, at http://www.
washtimes.com/commentary/20050219-092415-7342r.htm.
corroborating evidence standards; stripped judicial review of final orders
of removal; and expanded terrorist-related bars to asylum.
2 27
A. Escalated Burden of Proof Credibility, and
Corroborating Evidence Standards
REAL ID Section 101 relates to the escalated burden of proof as well
228as heightens credibility and corroborating evidence standards. In
particular, section 101(a)(3) requires that the asylum seeker show that
one of the five enumerated grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group or political opinion) "was or will be at least
one central reason" for the persecution. 229 Prior to REAL ID, asylum
seekers could establish eligibility for asylum by showing a mixed-
motive for the persecution, albeit the results varied depending upon
which Circuit Court of Appeals was binding on the Immigration Court.
For example, some claims involving persecutory intent related to an
enumerated ground as well as a law enforcement or military recruitment
motive.2 30 Even before REAL ID, a claim failing to establish a nexus
between an enumerated ground and the persecution would fail. However,
depending upon its implementation, REAL ID may eliminate mixed-
motive asylum claims through the requirement that the enumerated
ground be "one central reason" for the persecution. 31
Legal scholar Cianciarulo, who analyzed the asylum related provisions
of REAL ID, provides a compelling argument that the substitution of "at
least one central reason" does not raise the asylum seeker's burden of
proof because that language is based on DHS' misunderstanding of the
term "root of persecution" in Gebremichael v. INS.232 However, based
227. See REAL ID Now the Law, supra note 15. Areas where REAL ID might improve
the asylum process involve the elimination of caps on adjustment of status for asylees
and on the number of refugees or asylees claiming eligibility based on coercive population
control. See REAL ID §§ 101(g)(1) and (2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005)).
228. With respect to withholding of removal, REAL ID § 101(c) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1231 (2005)) amends INA § 241(b)(3) establishing the same burden of proof
and credibility standards used for asylum, as amended by REAL ID § 101 (a)(3) (codified
at INA § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005)).
229. REAL ID § 101(a)(3). This provision of REAL ID made similar modifications
to Withholding of Removal (INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2005)). See
IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, CRS REPORT 33125 2
(Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33125_20051017.pdf. Cf
supra at 226 (discussing the burden of proof pre-REAL ID).
230. ANKER, supra note 39, at 280-85.
231. IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF REAL ID, supra note
15, at 5-6 (discussing that a claim based on extortion involving an economic motive
along with an enumerated ground would qualify, but if it only involved an economic
motive would not).
232. 10 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussed in Cianciarulo, supra note 37, at 118-
19).
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on the heavy caseloads and lack of guidance to asylum officers who
usually conduct initial screenings, there is reason to suspect that
adjudicators may interpret the centrality language from REAL ID as
requiring a greater showing of the nexus between an enumerated ground
and the harm suffered.
An asylum seeker is not presumed credible. On appeal, however, the
asylum seeker may have a rebuttable presumption of credibility. 233 Legal
scholars have underscored that "[c]redibility is arguably the most crucial
aspect of any asylum case. '23 4 In making credibility determinations, section
101(a)(3) affords immigration judges greater discretion in determining
an asylum seeker's credibility based on the totality of circumstances,
including demeanor, candor, consistency of oral and written statements,
and inherent plausibility of testimony.235 This provision of REAL ID
strengthens an immigration judge's ability to make a negative credibility
finding and represents a reversal of Ninth Circuit precedent "that an
adjudicator must make explicit the reasons for an adverse credibility
finding or the court will accept the applicant's testimony as credible., 23"
In addition, REAL ID affords immigration judges greater latitude
in credibility determinations because inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or
falsehoods not central to the asylum claim may nevertheless factor into
making a credibility determination.237 The Eleventh Circuit in Jasem v.
U.S. Atty. Gen.238 noted while the greater deference and leeway granted
to immigration judges' credibility determination by REAL ID did not
apply in that case, the Court had not yet issued a published opinion on
239
the applicability or effective date of those provisions.
Furthermore, section 101(a)(3) authorizes immigration judges to
require corroborating evidence for otherwise credible testimony "unless
the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain
the evidence., 240 Thus, this provision of REAL ID also challenges Ninth
233. REAL ID § 101(a)(3).
234. Cianciarulo, supra note 37, at 129.
235. See Jared Joyce-Schleimer, The State of the Real Id Act of 2005, 19 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 611 (2005).
236. IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF REAL ID, supra note
15, at 3 (citing Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) and Cordon-Garcia v. INS,
204 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2000)).
237. REAL ID § 101(a)(3).
238. 157 Fed. App. 153, 158-60 (1 th Cir. 2005).
239. 1d. at 160 n.7.
240. REAL ID § 101 (a)(3). In addition to the impact of the provisions of REAL ID
on evidentiary requirements, some in the immigration field have expressed concern with
Circuit precedent "that an applicant's credible testimony alone always
sufficed to sustain the burden of proof of eligibility where it was
unrefuted, direct, and specific. 241  However, asylum may be granted
despite the absence of corroborating evidence where the immigration
judge finds the asylum seeker's testimony credible, persuasive and refers
to specific facts showing that he is a refugee.242
B. Judicial Review of Final Orders of Removal
REAL ID section 106 eliminates habeas and other non-direct judicial
review of final orders of removal and recognizes that courts of appeals
have jurisdiction to review constitutional issues and questions of law.24 3
By eliminating habeas review of final orders of removal, REAL ID
makes a "petition for review filed with the appropriate court of appeals
in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for
judicial review of an order of removal[.] ' '244 A petition for review is also the
sole means for reviewing a relief claim under the Convention Against
Torture.245
To avoid a repeat of St. Cyr where the Supreme Court interpreted
Congressional intent of IIRIRA as preserving general habeas jurisdiction,
REAL ID section 106 sets forth: "[f]or purposes of this Act, in every
provision that limits or eliminates judicial review or jurisdiction to





Within EOIR, the executive agency overseeing immigration courts,
there have been concerns over the greater deference given to immigration
judges as the trier of facts from the streamlining measures implemented
at the BIA and now, REAL ID section 106. Former BIA Chairman
Schmidt stated several reasons for the BIA's effectiveness as trier of fact.
the consequences of big law firms, who are able to hire investigators to search for
evidence, increasingly taking pro bono asylum cases. Executive Director Butterfield of
the American Immigration Lawyers Association worries that as a result of big firm pro
bono cases, immigration judges may unfairly raise the standard for corroborating evidence
beyond that required by statute. Elizabeth Amon, The Sheltering Storm: Winning Asylum Has
Never Been So Difficult. As More Firms Take On Cases, Can Their Zealous Advocacy
Overcome the Obstacles?, AM. LAW., Feb. 2006, at 66.
241. IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF REAL ID, supra note
15, at 4 (citing Ladha v. I.N.S., 215 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2000)).
242. REAL ID § 101(a)(3).
243. IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF REAL ID, supra note
15, at 18.
244. REAL ID § 106 (codified at INA § 242(a)(5) (2005)). Habeas reviews of
removal orders pending at the district courts as of May 11, 2005, were transferred to the
appropriate court of appeals. Real ID Now the Law, supra note 15, at 814.
245. REAL ID § 106 (codified at INA § 242(a)(4) (2005)).
246. Id.
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In many cases, the expertise, independence, and sound judgment of this Board
is all that stands between an asylum applicant and return to a place where he or
she will face persecution or death. It is quite possible that we review more
asylum adjudications than any other tribunal in the world. Certainly, each
Board Member adjudicates many more asylum cases, from a wider variety of
nationalities, than any individual Immigration Judge... Therefore, it is not clear
to me why our vantage point is necessarily less revealing than that of the
Immigration Judge and why we want to give such great deference to the
Immigration Judge[.]
247
Conferring greater weight to the immigration judge's findings of fact
may appear rational because the immigration judge is able to observe the
asylum seeker's demeanor in the courtroom. However, there are
significant concerns of constraints on the immigration judge's role as
sole trier of facts given the heavy caseload and pressures of rendering an
oral decision.248 Thus, the immigration judge's greater ability to make a
negative credibility finding coupled with the insulation of that decision
from judicial review may a violate due process.
Legal scholar Legomsky recently examined former Attorney General
Ashcroft's reformation of the BIA and Congress' restrictions on judicial
review as devastating to the decisional independence of immigration
judges. Legomsky states that Ashcroft's reforms sent a clear message:
"You rule against the government at your personal peril., 249 He argues
that decisional independence is critical to safeguarding the rule of law in
terms of procedural fairness and that Congress and the executive branch
have assaulted decisional independence. 250 Efforts to consolidate appeals of
immigration cases in the Federal Circuit illustrates that the attack on
decisional, or more precisely judicial, independence is not limited to
administrative judges.
251
C. Expanded Terrorist-Related Bars to Asylum
REAL ID sections 103 and 105 created a great media stir because
these provisions expanded the definitions of "terrorist activity" and
"terrorist organization." Those sections also expanded the definition and
the inadmissibility grounds based on having engaged in terrorist activities,
247. Schoenholtz, supra note 33, at 355 (citing Matter of A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106,
1114 (BIA 1998) (Schmidt, dissenting).
248. See supra at 229-30.
249. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL
L. REv. 369, 370 (2006).
250. Id. at 398, 408.
251. See supra text accompanying note 12.
and apply retroactively. 252  Moreover, REAL ID eliminated the
difference between deportability and inadmissibility on terror-related
grounds.2 53 Proponents and critics debated whether these provisions of
REAL ID provide greater protection against terrorist attack. 4 Prior to
REAL ID, an alien had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
he did not and should not have reasonably known that his solicitation or
material support would further an organization's terrorist activities to
qualify for the exception to the inadmissibility ground of engaging in
terrorist activity ("security bar").255
REAL ID Section 103 increased the burden of proof to clear and
convincing evidence to show that the actor did not and should not
reasonably have known that his act affords material support.2 56  In
addition, Section 103 eliminated the requirement that the act be in
furtherance of the organization's terrorist activity. 257 Prior to REAL ID,
the security bar had been applied to notable cases, including Orlando
Bosch Avila, former leader of anti-Castro Cuban resistance, and Omar
Ahmed Ali, leader of a fundamentalist movement whose followers were
involved in 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
258
However, REAL ID's expansion of the inadmissibility grounds created a
conflict with U.S. foreign policy and with U.S. refugee policy. Burmese
refugees of various ethnicities scheduled to be resettled in the United
States after having lived for many years in refugee camps in Thailand
were barred from entering the United States because of REAL ID's
material support bar to asylum in conjunction with provisions of the
Patriot Act. 239  These refugees had provided minimal assistance to a
252. REAL ID §§ 103, 105 (codified respectively at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2005) and 8
U.S.C. § 1227 (2005)).
253. IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF REAL ID, supra note
15, at 19.
254. Meissner, supra note 226; House Passes Real ID, supra note 1; Patricia J.
Freshwater, Note, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement under the Convention Against
Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the Torture of Its Citizens?, 19
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585, 593 (2005) (noting that "no member of Al-Qaeda who was
involved in the attacks of 9/11 had been granted asylee status in the United States; all
had entered the country through other legal immigration routes.").
255. IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF REAL ID, supra note
15, at 19 (engaging in terrorist activity was defined in former INA section
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)).
256. REAL ID § 103 (codified at INA § 212 (a)(3)(B)(i)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)
(i)(1) (2005)).
257. Id.
258. ANKER, supra note 39, at 443.
259. Rachel L. Swains, Provision ofAntiterror Law Delays Entry of Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A20; Press Release, State Department, Secretary Decides
Material Support Bar Inapplicable to Ethnic Karen Refugees in Tham Hin Camp,
Thailand (May 5, 2006) at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/65911 .htm (on file with
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group in Burma that advocated the self-defense of ethnic Karen against
Burmese government repression.260 Eventually, after a great deal of pressure
from organizations and individuals that had been working with Burmese
refugees, Secretary of State Rice issued a waiver to REAL ID's material
support bar for these refugees.
Around the time that organizations were pressing the Secretary of
State to issue a waiver, the BIA rendered a decision in Matter of S-K-
26'
involving an ethnic Chin Burmese respondent. The asylum seeker by
having donated money for approximately 11 months to the Chin National
Front ("CNF") whose goal is to secure freedom for ethnic Chin in Burma,
was held by the immigration judge and affirmed by the BIA to have
provided material support to a terrorist group. As such, she was statutorily
barred from asylum and from withholding of removal. The BIA found
there was no mens rea requirement in order for the material support bar
to apply and "that Congress intentionally drafted the terrorist bars to
relief very broadly, to include even those people described as "freedom
fighters," and it did not intend to give us discretion to create exceptions
for members of organizations to which our Government might be
sympathetic. ' 262 BIA Member Osuna cautioned in a concurring opinion:
the statutory language is breathtaking in its scope. Any group that has used a
weapon for any purpose other than for personal monetary gain can, under this
statute, be labeled a terrorist organization. This includes organizations that the
United States Government has not thought of as terrorist organizations because
their activities coincide with our foreign policy.
263
These changes have significant implications for overturning the long-
standing policy that an individual who committed a serious political
crime may qualify for asylum. 264 A political crime is contrasted to a
non-political crime in the Refugee Convention. Moreover, while the
SDILJ); BIA Denies Asylum to Burmese Christian Chin under Material Support Bar, 83
No. 25 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1297, 1297-1300 (July 3, 2006).
260. Id.; Rachel L. Swains, U.S. Eases Curbs on Resettling Burmese Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A18.
261. 23 I & N Dec. 936, 936 (BIA 2006) (decided June 8, 2006). Subsequently,
DHS granted respondent deferral of removal under the Convention against Torture.
Terrorist Support Exception Extended to Chin Refugees from Burma, 83 No. 41
INTERPRETER RELEASES 2255, 2256 (Oct. 23, 2006).
262. Id. at 941.
263. Id. at 948 (Osuna, concurring).
264. See Anker supra note 39, at 351-55 (discussing political offenses and the "long
American tradition of granting protection to persons based on their activities in resistance
to totalitarian regimes"). Id. at 352.
Refugee Convention precludes granting refugee status to those who have
committed a serious non-political crime, it creates an exception for political
offenses.265
In determining whether an offence is "non-political" or is, on the contrary, a"political" crime, regard should be given in the first place to its nature and
purpose, i.e., whether it has been committed out of genuine political motives
and not merely for personal reasons or gain .... The political nature of the
offence is also more difficult to accept if it involves acts of an atrocious
nature.
266
The end of the Cold War along with the proliferation of international
agreements and domestic legislation to prevent any act of terrorism
suggests a growing hostility to asylum seekers who committed political
crimes, even in totalitarian regimes, which will present an enormous
barrier to qualifying for asylum.
The purpose of the security bar is to prevent those who support
terrorism that threatens U.S. national security from obtaining a benefit
under the INA. In evaluating whether an alien's activities constitute a
danger to U.S. security, the Ninth Circuit in Cheema v. Ashcroft, a pre-
REAL ID decision, stated,
it is by no means self-evident that a person engaged in extra-territorial or
resistance activities-even militant activities-is necessarily a threat to the
security of the United States. One country's terrorist can often be another
country's freedom-fighter.
267
The court in Cheema articulated a two-part analysis: (1) did the alien
engage in a terrorist activity, and (2) are there reasonable grounds to
believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.
268
Evaluating whether an alien is a danger to the security of the United
States "requires evidence, not speculation.,
269
Following the enactment of REAL ID there is scant caselaw addressing
the security bar, what constitutes material support, or what constitutes a
danger to U.S. national security. The Third Circuit in Singh-Kaur v.
265. Id
266. HANDBOOK, supra note 161, at 152. Cf Matter of O'Cealleagh, 23 1 & N
Dec. 976, 980-84 (BIA 2006) (INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) requires that the offense must
be completely or totally "political.").
267. 383 F.3d 848, 858 (9th Cir. 2004).
268. Id. at 859.
269. Id. The Ninth Circuit described the Contras in Nicaragua as using "terrorist
tactics," but emphasized that, absent specific evidence, it would be "difficult to
conclude ... that supporters of the Contras within the United States compromised
national defense." Id. at 858. The court also described Congress' action of passing the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 to pressure South Africa to free Nelson
Mandela, whom the South African government had convicted of treason, from prison as
a prime example of an act that did not endanger the security of the United States. Id. at
859.
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Ashcroft held that providing food and setting up shelter qualifies as
material support to establish inadmissibility based on engaging in terrorist
activity.270 In an unpublished decision, Arias v. Gonzales, Arias argued
that he qualified for the exception to the inadmissibility ground because
he did not reasonably know that his conduct provided material support.
The Third Circuit held that there was substantial evidence to show that
Arias made voluntary payments to the FARC, a designated terrorist
organization, which amounted to the alien reasonably knowing he
provided material support.27 1
However, in Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit held in a pre-
REAL ID decision that the BIA committed legal error by failing to
consider an alien's state of mind at the time of soliciting membership for
a terrorist organization to determine inadmissibility for engaging in
terrorist activity. 272 The alien's state of mind is relevant to qualifying for
the exception to the inadmissibility ground as he has to "'demonstrate
that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the
solicitation would further the organization's terrorist activity.'
273
Third Circuit Court Judge Barry in discussing McAllister v. Attorney
General, 444 F.3d 178 (2006), which involved a North Irish family who
sought asylum in the United States but were barred because of the
father's activities in 1981 in support of the Irish National Liberation
Army, aptly addresses a problem with current legislation that prevents
individual determinations by relying upon blanket terms. 2 74 "It simply
should not be that, particularly in circumstances such as those we now
have before us, the individual and his individuality are largely, if not
entirely, irrelevant, lost in a sea of dispositive definitions and harsh and
complex laws. 275
270. 385 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2004).
271. 143 Fed. App. 464, 468 (3d Cir. 2005); but see supra at 219 (discussing the
U.S. Committee for Refugees' criticism of the utilization of cases of extortion to satisfy
the inadmissibility ground based on material support for a terrorist organization).
272. 355 F.3d 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2004).
273. Id. at 628 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V)(cc)).
274. 444 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (Barry, J. concurring).
275. Id. at 192.
V. LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH GREATER RESTRICTIONS ON
ASYLUM-SEEKERS IMPOSED BY REAL ID
As noted by Congresswoman Lofgren, many groups commented on
the negative impact that REAL ID would have on asylum seekers. The
American Immigration Lawyers' Association highlighted that provisions
of REAL ID would "prevent people fleeing from persecution from
obtaining asylum[.]"2 76 Human Rights Watch warned that REAL ID
"undercuts U.S. commitments to vulnerable populations, and it does
so disingenuously by dressing up its proposals in the language of
terrorism[.],, 277 Amnesty International condemned the passage of REAL
ID, especially as it applied to female asylum seekers. 278 "[I]mmigration
judges or asylum officers would be authorized to deny asylum if they
mistakenly distrusted an asylum applicant's demeanor, or because an
applicant wasn't able to produce a particular piece of evidence. ' 79
Human Rights First criticized REAL ID noting that those having
suffered human rights abuses and persecution will be harmed.280 With
respect to religious persecution, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
criticized the measure making persecution on account of religion a
central reason for persecution as it required "'prov[ing] with unrealistic
precision what is going on in their persecutors' minds.' ' 281 Similarly,
UNHCR stated,
[w]hile UNHCR fully supports states' efforts to prevent terrorists from abusing
asylum programs, we believe the provisions of H.R. 418 that impact refugee
protection do not achieve this goal and could prevent those truly at risk of
persecution from finding safety in the U.S.282
An area of asylum law that critics of REAL ID believe will be harshly
impacted is gender-related claims of persecution as the United States
276. Lofgren, supra note 46, at 376.
277. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK IN HOUSE BILL
(H.R. 10) (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/10/06/usdom
9469 txt.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter "IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UNDER
ATTACK IN HOUSE BILL"].
278. AMNESTY INT'L, THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005 AND ITS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON
ASYLUM SEEKERS (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/uspolicy/pdf/ ealid_
0305.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
279. Id.
280. Bob Egelko, New Limit on Review of Asylum Cases Immigration Judges'
Decisions Would Be Harder to Overturn, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 2005, at Al.
281. Id.
282. Lofgren, supra note 46, at 376-77 (quoting Letter from UNHCR to Rep. Zoe
Lofgren (Feb. 4, 2005)).
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has inconsistently observed UNHCR guidelines on the protection of
refugee women.
Critics assailed REAL ID as violating international law, both
customary international law and treaties. The heightened burden of
proof requiring that persecution based on an enumerated ground be a
central reason of the claim is not supported in the Handbook or Refugee
Convention and leads critics to argue that an asylum seeker would have
to demonstrate her persecutor's mental state. 28 4 This provision violates
Article 27 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
which establishes an individual's right to "seek and receive asylum in
foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of each country and with
international agreements. 2 8  This provision also violates the spirit of
the duty of non-refoulement. Increasing the burden of proof to qualify
for asylum beyond the international standard set forth in the Refugee
Convention may result in denials of numerous bona fide asylum claims.
In addition, the modifications made by REAL ID to withholding of
removal also indicate violations of non-refoulement, especially in light
of the fact that withholding of removal is not a discretionary remedy.
Another highly controversial provision of REAL ID is the stripped
judicial review of final orders of removal, which violates Article 13 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").
216
This article provides that removal must be "in accordance with law,"
which includes the right to appeal a removal order with a limited
exception for "compelling reasons of national security[.],, 28 7 Unless an
asylum seeker is charged with a terrorist-related ground of inadmissibility
or removability, she is entitled to a right to appeal the immigration
judge's decision. Given the BIA's increased reliance on summary
affirmances, it is not unreasonable to construe the right to appeal in
conjunction with a due process requirement that the case receive
meaningful review.
283. Amy K. Arnett, One Step forward, Two Steps Back: Women Asylum-Seekers in
the United States and Canada Stand to Lose Human Rights under the Safe Third Country
Agreement, 9 LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 951, 954-55 (2005).
284. IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK IN HOUSE BILL, supra note 277.
285. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 1948,
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992).
286. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
287. Id. at 372.
The heightened credibility and corroborating evidence requirements of
REAL ID are also likely to violate international law. Legomsky has
noted the assault on immigration judges' decisional independence and
others comment on the great variance in the rate of granting asylum.
288
In addition, insulating credibility determinations from judicial review
will lead to inconsistent results sometimes resulting in the arbitrary
denial of asylum. Furthermore, the standards for assessing credibility
may be unreasonable based on how the trier of facts interprets language
and demeanor which vary greatly among asylum seekers who are in a
"particularly vulnerable situation." 289 In addition, an asylum seeker may
be found not credible based on inaccuracies or inconsistencies which are
not central to the asylum claim.
REAL ID also violates the Convention Against Torture because
despite asylum seekers' ability to establish that it is more likely than not
that she will be tortured upon return to the country of flight, a conviction
or suspicion of terrorism will bar relief. Furthermore, decisions to deny
Convention Against Torture relief are insulated from judicial review
thereby violating Article 13 of the ICCPR.
Critics have also assailed REAL ID for violating international law
standards against the arbitrary arrest and detention of asylum seekers.
290
This criticism is somewhat misplaced because the arbitrary arrest and
detention of asylum seekers was implemented by IIRIRA's expedited
removal procedures. Nevertheless, studies such as the USCIRF's on the
impact of expedited removal procedures on asylum seekers' claims
clearly shows that some asylum seekers are unlawfully being denied safe
haven in the United States. 291 Absent exigent circumstances, mandatory
detention of a class of individuals without an individual determination
violates due process.292
288. See supra at 248; supra note 108.
289. See HANDBOOK, supra note 161.
290. IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UNDER ATrACK IN HOUSE BILL, supra note 277.
291. See supra at 243.
292. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 551-552 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Due
process calls for an individual determination before someone is locked away. In none of
the cases cited did we ever suggest that the government could avoid the Due Process
Clause by doing what [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(c) does, by selecting a class of people for
confinement on a categorical basis and denying members of that class any chance to
dispute the necessity of putting them away."). See also Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away
International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 117, 130 (2001) ("Both [the ICCPR
and Refugee Convention] fail to define 'due process,' although the ICCPR provides us
with minimum guarantees that must be applied in criminal cases. These include the right
to prompt information concerning the nature and cause of the charge against a defendant
in a language that she understands; adequate time and resources to prepare a defense and
communicate with counsel whom she chooses; trial without undue delay; trial in her
presence and a right to defend herself or to defense through legal assistance of her
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Recent legislation aims to further restrict the asylum process and
threatens asylum seekers' rights under international law. Congressman
Sensenbrenner introduced the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and
Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,293 which would prevent refugees
and asylees with an aggravated felony conviction from entering the
country or becoming permanent residents. 294 The bill was passed by the
House of Representatives on December 16, 2005, and may have a
devastating impact on asylum seekers. Immigration reform legislation
such as the bill introduced by Sensenbrenner has provoked public outcry
by pro-immigrant groups, as well as support by immigration restrictionists.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although restrictive asylum and immigration legislation is a response
to increased national security concerns post 9/11, it is critical to evaluate
whether such legislation actually makes the country safer. In addition,
such legislation must be evaluated not only in terms of whether it
imposes an unreasonable burden on noncitizens, but also whether it is
contrary to U.S. and international principles of liberty and equality
before the law. Referencing Dred Scott v. Sandford2 95 for its lesson about
sacrificing noncitizens' liberty to preserve citizens' liberty and theorist
Alexander Bickel, legal scholar Cole highlights that "our experience
with delimiting rights on the basis of citizenship should give us pause. 296
He also notes that "reliance on double standards reduces the legitimacy
of our struggle, and that legitimacy may be our most valuable asset[.],,
297
The judiciary tends to afford the executive branch great deference in
matters concerning immigration and asylum law because of their impact
on national sovereignty. However, the Supreme Court's rulings on
choosing and to free legal assistance if necessary; to examine witnesses against her and
to obtain witnesses in her defense; free assistance of an interpreter; the right not to
incriminate herself; and the right to judicial review.").
293. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
294. Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Legislative Analysis of HR 4437 (posted
Dec. 23, 2005), available at http://www.ilrc.org/HR4437.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
295. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
296. Cole, supra note 7, at 980. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), for an example of delimiting rights on the basis of racial/ethnic background and
the Supreme Court's deference to the executive branch during wartime. See also
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.").
297. Cole, supra note 7, at 1004.
questionable executive policies like the interdiction of refugees on
makeshift rafts at sea and curtailed asylum review in Sale298 suggest that
the judiciary's deference to the executive branch and lack of rigorous
scrutiny of asylum policy leave executive powers virtually unchecked.
While deference to executive decisions is required in some areas of
immigration and asylum law, in recent years some U.S. courts have
abdicated their balancing role in the separation of powers and have not
provided meaningful review of asylum cases.
Likewise, Congressional legislation restricting asylum law and
procedures has steadily encroached upon one of the core principles of
due process-providing a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 299 The
Supreme Court in St. Cyr expressed concern that the legislature may use
"retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular
groups[.]y 300  Asylum seekers and immigrants are currently targets of
restrictive legislation and it is important for the judiciary to carefully
guard against laws denying asylum seekers basic human rights.
Given the enormous administrative and procedural difficulties with
effectively operating an asylum policy that complies with domestic
concerns and international law, appellate review must be improved.
To avoid inconsistent and often arbitrary results in the adjudication of
asylum claims, uniform evidentiary and credibility standards for
adjudication of asylum claims must be established. A great frustration
with asylum law is that even though it deals with federal law, the
results are so varied depending upon the circuit court of appeals where
the asylum seeker filed her application. 30 1  Additionally, given the
heavy caseloads, lack of resources at Immigration Courts, and widely
disparate outcomes depending upon whether or not an asylum seeker is
represented by an attorney, it is important to provide sufficient funding
to improve Immigration Courts. The number of appeals of immigration
judges' decisions will continue to grow until there is an effective
system that provides for the reliability of outcomes and legislation that
298. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 25 (In construing the [Refugee] Protocol
in Sale to fit the narrow constraints the Government preferred to impose on
domestic law, the Supreme Court did international law a double disservice.
First, the Court ignored the UNHCR's plea to avoid placing a falsely narrow
interpretation on the treaty... Second, the court supplied the Executive
Branch with a cynical defense to international criticism for breaching the
Protocol, muting the effect of international condemnation of the interdiction
policy.).
See also supra at 221-22.
299. For core principles of due process, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976).
300. See supra at 238-39.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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restores some discretionary forms of relief to avoid the increasingly
harsh outcomes for minor offenses.
Restoring administrative appellate review should improve the reliability
of outcomes, but it does not address the attack on the decisional
independence of immigration judges by the executive branch. To have
an effective Immigration Court, it is critical that asylum seekers receive
qualified legal representation to present their asylum claims. Moreover,
immigration officials at ports-of-entry and asylum officers should be
given better training and clear guidelines to follow when screening asylum
seekers.
Several federal appellate judges have commented on the lack of
procedural justice in immigration cases. Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals writes,
In [2005], different panels of this court reversed the Board of Immigration
Appeals in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to
review the Board that were resolved on the merits.
302
Posner identifies as the systemic problem that "the adjudication of these
cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards
of legal justice. 30 3
Drawing on O'Connor's dissenting opinion in the Medellin v. Dretke °4
case on informing aliens of their legal rights, it is imperative that asylum
seekers be informed of their rights. Enforcement activities to prevent
unlawful entry at the border or airports where individuals are not
informed of the right to seek asylum conflicts with obligations under
international law to inform asylum seekers of their legal rights.
To improve the asylum process, legislators should consider the
long-term consequences of whether proposed legislation will actually
make the country safer while taking into account how domestic
policies affect international perceptions of U.S. democracy and
commitment to the rule of law. The executive branch should have
independent agencies, like the USCIRF, conduct regular studies of
asylum procedures to ensure that all involved are complying with
domestic and international guidelines. Lastly, the judiciary should
prudently consider legislation and executive action to ensure that
302. Benslimane v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussed in Seipp
& Feal, supra note 143).
303. Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830 (noting that the problem of inadequate
adjudication of immigration cases is "not of recent origin").
304. 544 U.S. 660, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2104-05 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
asylum seekers' basic human rights are not violated and that U.S.
policies are not in contravention of international law.
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